DRAFT

PROCEEDINGS OF THE DEMOCRACY AND GOVERNANCE

PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENT WORKSHOP

On May 15-16, 1995, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) held an intensive two-day Democracy and Governance performance measurement workshop. The workshop was sponsored by the Center for Development Information and Evaluation (CDIE), the Office of Sector Advisers of the Policy and Program Center (PPC), and the Global Bureau's Center for Democracy and Governance (G/DG). It was the second in a series of four USAID workshops that included environment and natural resources, economic growth and humanitarian assistance.

Background

Democracy is a relatively new USAID sector. It is complex and does not easily lend itself to measurement. Indeed, frequently we find democracy and its constituent parts difficult to define. These and other problems pose particular challenges to the Agency's efforts to develop and implement valid and credible measures of its performance in promoting sustainable democracy.

The problems of assessing performance in democracy interventions are not unique to USAID. Other donors and academicians face similar difficulties. To date, attempts to assess democracy and governance programs have met with only limited success. Moreover, many assessments have been general in nature and not tied to specific democracy interventions.

In the last four years USAID Missions have been struggling with specifying performance measures for their democracy objectives. Many of these efforts were focused on specific sub-sectors (Rule of Law, for example) and have been uneven in quality.   In addition, Missions reported data on a relatively small proportion of the indicators they developed.

The lack of sound comparable performance measures makes it difficult for the Agency to assess and report on the overall effect of its democracy programs. Few Missions implement similar democracy strategies, and even then they are likely to use different measures. This presents multiple problems in aggregating results and estimating global outcomes of our support for democracy.

These problems, coupled with the needs of its new re-engineered system and the requirements of the Government Performance Reporting Act (GPRA) led USAID to sponsor performance measurement workshops in Democracy and Governance as well as other sectors. By developing performance measures in a systematic, orderly fashion, the Agency hopes to improve the overall quality of performance measurement across all sectors. Re-engineering and GPRA have stricter measurement and reporting requirements than those currently used. It also hopes to develop indicators that would be common to Missions implementing similar development strategies. Such "common" indicators (if they are possible) will contribute substantially to USAID to improve reporting on its democracy programs.

Workshop Goals

The primary goal of the workshop was to develop a set of candidate performance measures (indicators) that could be used by both the Agency and its Missions to assess the progress of USAID democracy programs. The two secondary goals were to conduct an inventory of democracy performance measures currently used by the Missions and to share democracy measurement experiences among the workshop participants.

The development of candidate performance measures serves two important purposes. First, it brings to bear a wide range of expertise and experience to identifying or constructing indicators. This approach should result in measures which are more valid and credible than those currently available. Second, the workshop should also produce indicators that are applicable to a wide range of settings.

This does not mean that all current indicators should be discarded. Quite the opposite. The workshop staff's inventory of current indicators helps to identify indicators which would form a starting point on which the workshop could begin their development of candidate indicators. The first hand experience of participants, particularly Mission staff served to enhance the identification and construction of indicators.

Preparing for the Workshop

The workshop staff conducted extensive preparation for the workshop. Materials were prepared and assembled to provide participants with background information on USAID democracy strategy and the state of the art in democracy performance measurement as well as guidelines and starting points for indicator development. The work included preparing a Democracy and Governance Results framework, an inventory of current democracy performance indicators, a list of possible candidate indicators, and guidelines and criteria for developing or selecting candidate indicators.

The Democracy and Governance Strategic Framework

In designing the workshop, the staff began with developing a strategic framework for Democracy and Governance. This framework was based on one that was outlined by G/DG and consisted of four Agency objectives (sub-sectors):

- Strengthening the Rule of Law and Respect for Human Rights

- Free and Fair Elections

- Strengthening Civil Society

- More Accountable Governance

Each of these Agency objectives subsumed four or more supporting objectives. These supporting objectives were developed by the workshop staff, using previous democracy frameworks, the Agency's democracy strategy document, the democracy implementation guidelines and their own experience in this sector.

To the extent possible, the framework reflected USAID's definition of Democracy and Governance. That is, the framework included those objectives to which the Agency would commit itself to in supporting sustainable democracy. The framework may have some imperfections. Because neither democracy nor its components are well defined it is not possible to get a consensus on the relationship among them and how they should be organized. For example, knowledge of one's civil rights could be categorized under either Civil Society, Rule of Law or Human Rights. These problems of overlap can never be satisfactorily resolved. Indeed, since the conclusion of the workshop, two iterations of the democracy framework have evolved.

The Performance Indicator Inventory

The workshop staff reviewed all of the approximately 400 Democracy and Governance performance indicators currently in the PRISM data file. Mission Democracy and Governance objectives and their corresponding indicators were coded against the Democracy and Governance framework described above. Each Mission's objective was classified into one framework category along with its performance indicators, resulting in a preliminary categorization of the performance measures.

Indicators in the initial categories were then reviewed for clarity, completeness and duplication. Unclear indicators were, where possible, restated on the basis of their cognate objectives, or in a few cases, deleted. Incomplete indicators were treated in the same manner. Duplicate indicators were deleted, but a count was kept of how many times they appeared in the inventory.

As is the case with all classification schemes, a number of difficulties arose during the process. The disaggregation of democracy into four major categories created some problems in classifying Mission objectives. For example, Mission objectives dealing with acceptance of democratic values could be categorized under both Civil Society and Rule of Law and Human Rights. Similarly, greater citizen participation could fit under both Civil Society and More Accountable Governance. The inventory's categories serve as an initial step in the Agency's plans to develop a comprehensive performance measurement system for democracy.

Possible Candidate Performance Indicators

The workshop staff also developed sets of "possible" indicators for each of the four Agency objectives and their corresponding supporting objectives. Included here was a refined list of strong Mission indicators as well as indicators used in Agency and Mission evaluations. A limited number came from outside sources and from Agency experts in each of the four sub-sectors.

Each objective is accompanied by its specific results anticipated. These are in no way comprehensive and are subject to revision. Their corresponding possible performance indicators should be seen in the same light.

The possible indicators were just that, possible. They were not prescriptive in any way. Rather, they were starting points from which each breakout group began its deliberations. In some cases, the groups adopted some of the possible indicators as candidate indicators when the former met the indicators selection criteria.

Guidelines for Selecting Indicators

The staff prepared a set of guidelines to help the individual working groups in their selecting candidate indicators and to instill selection uniformity across the four sub-sectors. These included instructions for the groups as to how they could proceed in their deliberations as well as the criteria against which indicators could be compared in deciding if they should become candidate measures.

Background Materials

Finally the staff compiled a set of background materials relating to the Agency's democracy strategy, performance measurement and related topics. These materials included:

- Strategies for Sustainable Development

- Democracy Implementation Guidelines

- Government Performance and Results Act of 1994

- USAID Evaluation News: Performance Measurement

- OMB Primer on Performance Measurement

- Annual Performance Report: Democracy Chapter

- The Comparative Survey of Freedom: 1994-1995

- Mozambique API FY 1993-1995

- Guatemala Action Plan FY 1995-1996

- Performance Measurement, Evaluation and Reporting Results

Workshop Presenters

The staff recruits a group of expert presenters from within and outside USAID. These were persons intimately familiar with performance measurements in democracy. Some had first-hand experience in assessing democracy programs at the Mission level. Others were experts at country-level assessments. The presenters at the workshop were:

Larry Garber, Senior USAID Democracy Advisor, who gave the overall Agency perspective on performance measurement in democracy and the need to establish sound performance indicators.

Charles Costello, Director of USAID's Democracy and Governance Center, who discussed the Center's goals and activities with respect to performance measurement.

Janet Ballantyne, Director of the Center for Development Information and Evaluation, who discussed CDIE's role in strategic planning and performance measurement.

Gerald Britan of CDIE outlined the workshop goals and agenda.

Michael Hendricks, evaluation consultant, addressed the basic issues for all performance indicators, not only those for assessing Democracy performance. Dr. Hendricks discussed the traits of good indicators and the options possible when developing them, including quantification and focusing on actual behaviors.

Mary McIntosh, U.S. Information Agency discussed the use and limitation of public opinion polling in measuring results in democracy. Specific issues included attitudes and beliefs, stability of polling data, and interpreting results.

Joseph Ryan of the Freedom House presented on the Freedom House Index. Dr. Ryan described the methodology used in developing the Index and its current applications. He also covered the extent to which the Freedom House Index can be used to assess performance in democracy.

Juliet Born, USAID/Mozambique and **Elizabeth Hogan**, USAID/Guatemala share their recent experiences in preparing Mission democracy strategies and performance measures.

Lynn Carter, Management Systems International, presented on the current USAID Democracy Framework and the results on the analysis of democracy performance indicators in the current PRISM system.

Graham Kerr, CDIE discussed the concepts and practices of performance measurement and impact assessment now used in USAID. He differentiated among performance measures, Agency goals and objectives and Mission objectives and results.

Workshop Participants

Approximately eighty people working in democracy programs and their assessment participated in the workshop. These included representatives from USAID field mission and Washington, other U.S. Government Agencies, international organizations, non-government organizations (NGOs) and contractors. This diversity among participants resulted in a representation of a wide range of experiences and points of view during workshop deliberations.

The participation of Mission staff was particularly valuable. Their on the ground knowledge and experience was very useful in determining the feasibility and utility of the candidate indicators. Non-USAID participants saw, perhaps for the first time, how the Agency arrived at its strategic plans and corresponding performance measures.

The workshop served an important function of bringing these disparate groups together to work jointly on developing and selecting candidate indicators. Up to that time, most of the indicator development was fragmented among individual Missions pursuing specific democracy objectives. The workshop changed this by focusing not only on Mission level measures, but on Agency performance indicators as well.

Finally, the mere convening of the workshop underscores the seriousness of USAID's intent with respect to performance measurement. By assembling participants within and outside the Agency, USAID hoped to obtain the best possible input for developing candidate indicators. In addition, it hoped to stimulate further efforts to develop a comprehensive system of performance measurement in democracy.

Workshop Format

The workshop was organized into *plenary* and *breakout* sessions. Two plenary sessions were held; one at the beginning of the workshop and one at the end. The first plenary session included introductions to the workshop as well as presentations by invited speakers. The topics included:

• desirable characteristics of performance indicators

• use of indices to measure democracy performance

• the advantages and disadvantages of using public opinion polling to measure democracy performance

• the state-of-the-art of performance measurement at USAID

• assessing democracy at the Mission level

• USAID's newly developed results framework

The subsequent plenary session was held at the end of the second day of the workshop. It served to summarize the results of the breakout sessions, respond to any questions or issues raised and to discuss possible follow-up activities.

A spokesperson presented the results of his or her breakout group at the second session. The presentations included the methods each group employed in developing or selecting candidate performance indicators, the problems encountered in the exercise, and suggestions for further work. the presenters answered questions from the floor and commented on participants' suggestions on their group's indicators.

Workshop Products

DRAFT

**SUMMARY OF THE GROUP WORKING ON
AGENCY OBJECTIVE 1:
STRENGTHENED RULE OF LAW AND INCREASED
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS**

Introduction

The Agency Results framework for this objective includes seven supporting objectives. The group discussed and derived candidate indicators for 4 of the supporting objectives: improved timeliness in rendering justice; more effective judicial process/laws consistently applied; expanded knowledge of legal rights; and improved monitoring and advocacy of human rights (including justice sector reform). The three supporting objectives which were **not** covered due to time constraints included: increased access to a dispute resolution process; increased openness and transparency in the judicial process; and citizen rights and interests better protected in the law. The participants also developed possible indicators for the Agency objective itself.

Most of the participants were unfamiliar with the Agency results framework which was used as a schema for organizing results and indicators. While the participants cooperated in trying to keep the focus on indicators rather than the categorization scheme used in the framework, there were questions about what went where (and why items were placed where they were). USAID participants felt that they would like to have an opportunity both to understand and vet the framework.

The group felt that in addition to coming up with a menu of indicators for common objectives, it could be very useful for the handbook to include advice on target setting for particular indicators.

AGENCY OBJECTIVE 1: Strengthened Rule of Law and Increased Respect for Human Rights

The group first listed the highest-level results which might be expected from USAID programs in the ROL area and then discussed indicators for each result:

Result 1: Increased expectation of timely and impartial application of the law

Indicator 1: % of users/practitioners/lawyers/other experts who have this expectation

This indicator represents a modification of surveying general public opinion. The audience surveyed in this indicator would be one that has some contact with the judicial system and therefore can comment meaningfully on its performance. Data would be collected via a sample survey that would be disaggregated according to salient group. Gender might also be a factor here.

Indicator 2: case mix - percentage change in the kinds of cases brought to court (i.e., involving corruption, commercial issues, human rights)

In some countries it might be possible to garner information from judicial statistics. In others, a sample survey of cases would be necessary.

Result 2: the Justice system protects against violations of the law by public officials

Indicator 1: Number (or percent) of those accused of human rights prosecuted; % of those prosecuted convicted

This number needs to be compared with the number of those who are accused. This can be disaggregated by official, non-government violations. The indicator may not tell the full story if the political climate is such that individuals are afraid to report violations or feel that such reports are unlikely to generate a suitable response.

Indicator 2: Number accused of corruption prosecuted; % of those who are prosecuted that are convicted

The same caveat that applies to the first indicator applies here.

Indicator 3: Number of detainees who are pre-trial and pre-sentencing; average length of stay

The indicators respond to strategies related to bail and pre-trial release programs and delay reduction interventions. It may not be possible to collect accurate data in all countries - prisoners do "disappear" in jail when files are lost or misplaced. There may also be political sensitivities involved in reporting these data. If absolute numbers cannot be obtained, then it might be possible to do a sample survey of defendants during or after sentencing to ask about length of stay. The accuracy of their reporting about length of time in prison would need to be investigated on a pilot basis before proceeding with the full survey.

Result 3: Citizens accept the importance and value of equal rights for all citizens

Indicator 1: Percent of population believing in equal rights

Data must be collected via a stratified random sample survey. It can be disaggregated via target groups and gender. It can ask about particular rights that USAID interventions have targeted. It is possible that this survey could be combined with others mentioned in the rule of law section. Most of the strategies supporting this result appear under the civil society objective (Agency Objective 3), but it seems essential to include this result as party of Agency Objective 1, given the wording of the objective.

There are issues here in terms of anticipating changes in beliefs. We are uncertain about the length of time it takes for deeply seated values and beliefs to change. We also know little about the potential link to political and economic performance and how volatile this data might be.

Supporting Objective 2: Improved timeliness

Measuring Timeliness Overall

For measuring the supporting objective overall, the group discussed three commonly used options: average or mean case processing time; case backlog; and percent of cases decided in a given period (the mirror of case backlog). Also discussed was a less frequent indicator - the ratio of cases disposed to cases filed. The preferred indicator was:

Indicator 1: average or mean case processing time

Seven Missions currently are measuring variants of case processing time, with somewhat different starting points. The time period measured for criminal cases would be a) from arrest to arraignment; b) from arraignment to bringing a case before the court; and c) from bringing a case before the court to case decision (in a court of the first instance). The reason for disaggregation is that USAID programs may not target interventions that affect all three stages, although it was recognized that improvements in any one stage would affect the whole.

The time period measured in non-criminal cases (civil, commercial, family) would be from the assignment of a case to a judge to case decision (in a court of the first instance).

Case processing time was preferred to the alternatives for the following reasons:

1. it captured benefits for all who came into contact with the courts, so it reports more fully on impact (it is more sensitive to change);

2. data could be collected via a sample survey and did not require good judicial statistics;

3. Greater clarity to a lay audience and more useful information for managers; and

4. a uniform standard of time.

By contrast, case backlog, and its mirror, cases accomplished in a given period, suffered from the lack of a standard time frame. Countries differ in the norm for what the maximum acceptable time frame for deciding a case is. There is no international standard that is widely used. This means that a case could be in backlog in one country after 18 months and in backlog in another after 3 years. If no time period norm exists in any given country, it could be difficult for USAID to negotiate one with the government for the purposes of the project.

Both of these indicators also only capture benefits for a portion of those who come into contact with the courts. The indicators are basically binary in nature - either the case has been resolved by x time or it's in backlog. For example, if the norm for processing a case is two years, but the average case processing time for one particular kind of case drops from 23 months to 14 months, this benefit would not be captured in either indicator.

Measuring Aspects of Timeliness

Result 1: Improved Investigations

Improvements in investigative skills are in some strategies designed to contribute to delay reduction. When such a strategy is in place, the preferred measure is

Indicator 1: average or mean length of time from the start of an investigation until case filing

Again, data can be collected via a sample survey. Greater efficiency is only one aspect of improving investigations. Effectiveness is captured in another supporting objective.

Result 2: Improved Procedures

Some Missions hope to contribute to more timely case processing by reforming procedures that allow or contribute to delays. There are two possible indicators:

Indicator 1: Reforms implemented (yes/no, by reform)

Indicator 2: # lawyers sanctioned or % cases in which lawyers are sanctioned by judges for causing unnecessary delays

If the first indicator is used, it could be useful to accompany it with follow up case studies to look at the impact of particular reforms on trials.

With respect to the second indicator, initially we might expect to see the number or percentage increase, as the system grows intolerant of frivolous delays. Eventually, the number or percentage should drop as trial "culture" changes, and lawyers learn that such behavior is not acceptable.

Result 3: Burden on the Courts Lifted

One strategy used is to initiate ADR programs in order to alleviate pressure on the courts. Two indicators of success seem possible here:

Indicator 1: rate of increase in cases filed in the courts and/or in ADR programs

Indicator 2: number of cases resolved through ADR programs (proxy)

If the intent is to lift the burden on the courts, then the best indicator would be to look at the rate of increase in cases filed, perhaps targeting specific kinds of cases which ought to move to ADR. The problem with this indicator is the time frame - most ADR programs that USAID is helping initiate are new and very small - they may not have much of an impact on court case load for a good many years. Looking, then, at either the increase in cases filed in ADR programs or the number of cases filed is a reasonable proxy and would allow us to make some judgment about the kind of contribution ADR is making. This indicator should be followed up by some attempt to derive what percentage of the ADR cases might actually have gone to the courts, had ADR not been available.

Supporting Objective 3: Expanded Knowledge of Legal Rights

The participants felt that number trained or number reached was not an adequate measure of expanded knowledge. There are a couple of ways of measuring knowledge. Probably the most direct indicator is:

Indicator 1: % of the (target) population knowing/understanding specific rights

This indicator can be disaggregated by target group. Missions can measure either the percentage of the total population or more simply the percent of those trained. The latter measure would only be appropriate if the intervention is a training program of some kind. If mass media is being used, then percent of total population is probably the more satisfactory measure. This indicator requires a sample survey for data collection. An alternative measure is:

Indicator 2: number of cases involving legal rights brought by target groups

This measure illustrates both increasing knowledge of rights as well as confidence that a fair hearing can be had in court. It assumes that no barriers exist to the bringing of a case other than lack of knowledge of rights. Therefore, in most country circumstances, it measures at a somewhat higher level than the actual supporting objective. A related, but broader, indicator has been used to measure the Agency Objective itself. It may be difficult to collect data for the indicator as formulated, since a straight count would depend on having adequate means to determine the total (judicial statistics, NGO rights groups, and the like). If it becomes necessary to survey the target population, to ask about cases brought, then the first indicator discussed (the one which captures enhanced understanding) is preferable.

Supporting Objective 4: More Effective Judicial Process/Consistent Application of the law

This is a very complex objective, with several dimensions. While it looks like a multi-dimension objective that could easily be broken apart, in practice it is difficult to do this. One dimension of effectiveness is that the law is consistently applied. On the other hand, the process can in theory be effective, but judicial decisions can go awry because of pressures or lack of adequate knowledge of the legal issues at hand.

The participants discussed possible aggregates for this supporting objective (% cases in which the laws were appropriately applied; % lower court decisions reversed upon appeal; % verdicts which a review entity declares inappropriate), and decided that there were no aggregates which were practical, sensitive to near-term improvements, and at a distinctly lower level than the indicators selected to measure the Agency objective itself. The first indicator poses too many problems in terms of cost-effective data collection and the second and third indicators are not appropriate for code countries. Therefore a decision was made to select measures for the important dimensions of this supporting objective and to combine them as appropriate in a pattern to illustrate progress toward this supporting objective.

Judges and other court officials have access to and knowledge of the law: This is a two part objective, and it requires two indicators.

Result 1: Judges and court officials have access to the law

Indicator 1: Targeted laws are:
1) up-to-date
2) published in a timely manner
3) available to all judges and court officials
4) organized in a manner which facilitates research

This is a qualitative indicator which requires judgments to be made. More work probably needs to be done to operationalize this indicator to permit consistent data collection and reporting across Missions.

Result 2: Judges are knowledgeable about the law

Knowledge is difficult to capture. Seemingly, judges and lawyers cannot be tested as part of any training program. In this environment (or most others, for that matter), there are very few possibilities. Trying to measure increased knowledge and skill due to training (the predominant strategy for affecting knowledge) by counting **numbers trained** is one approach discussed by the group (disaggregated according to pre-service training, in-service training, and specialization). It is not an entirely satisfactory one. It would need to be supplemented by the following:

1) **Self-reporting by judges** via telephone or in-person surveys among judges (a formal random sample survey).

These surveys would explore a) what judges believe they learned; and b) whether and how they have applied their new knowledge. While subject to some bias, this indicator could provide us with richer information than testing would because it asks about the application of new skills. It may be possible to replace the random sample survey with focus group interviews. This would lessen the cost and time requirements. Unfortunately, at this point, focus groups remain an untested technique for performance measurement. This is largely, because it is almost impossible to quantify the results of focus groups.

Result 3: Independence of Judges

There are a few choices here, depending on the strategy:

Indicator 1: Judicial selection and promotion based on merit and achievement (fully/partly/not at all)

coupled with

Indicator 2: Percent of judges hired under the merit system

Indicator 3: Judges' salaries are commensurate with a professional middle class standard of living (yes/no or percent of equivalent position)

Indicator 4: Existence of judicial tenure law (yes/no)

These are all proxies - they are suggestive of the conditions for independence but not proof of independence. More work may be needed here to see if better ways of measuring independence can be derived. The group had an issue with 4) - less as an indicator than as a strategy issue. The disadvantage of tenure laws is that you are then stuck with poorly performing judges (as well as competent ones) for life.

Result 4: The judicial branch is independent

It is difficult to derive simple quantitative indicators for this. One option is:

Indicator 1: The justice system controls the spending of its budget (yes/no)

The group discussed another indicator - percent of total budget resources allocated to the judiciary. This seemed somewhat problematic because it does not speak to the adequacy of resources for the judiciary. Another possibility is the percentage increase in resources for the judiciary (adjusted for inflation). At issue also is not simply the total amount of funding the justice system receives, but how the system allocates the funds it does get. Resources levels may also say more about effectiveness and efficiency than independence. More work needs to be done in this area.

Result 5: Court officials, lawyers and judges respect ethical standards

The following indicators were proposed:

Indicator 1: An ethics code exists for the judiciary (yes/no)

For this indicator, G/DG could work with field staff to establish a checklist of items that belong in a code and this could be the standard against which individual country codes are compared.

Indicator 2: Investigative entity is operational, as judged by the # of investigations

Indicator 3: Number of court officials removed or sanctioned

Indicator 4: Number of lawyers sanctioned (by the local equivalent of the Bar Association)

Again, these indicators are proxies and suggest that there is a climate which encourages ethical behavior and that the system is prepared to confront unethical behavior when it comes to light. The group noted that it might be impossible to collect data for indicator 3. It might also prove difficult to collect figures for item 4.

Result 5: Procedures Modernized

Indicators proposed include the following:

Indicator 1: Oral trial proceedings instituted (criminal/civil; fully/partially/not at all)

Indicator 2: Trial proceedings modernized and instituted (criminal/civil; fully/partially/not at all)

Both indicators involve an assessment according to a checklist of important elements that need to be in place. G D/G could develop such checklists in consultation with field staff and partners. The data collection methodology would involve some kind of sample survey that would permit surveyors to make checks against the checklist. The scale could be turned from a three point to a five point scale to be more sensitive to gradual improvements. The group noted that citizens' watchdog groups could perhaps be funded to handle the data collection and analysis. The wording of the indicator could also be changed to the following:

Indicator 3: Percent of criminal/civil trials in which the judges followed the correct trial procedures.

To capture improved investigative procedures, an appropriate indicator would be

Indicator 4: Percentage of criminal cases in which prosecutors followed proper investigative procedures

If a prosecutors' manual exists, this could provide the norm against which actual behavior would be compared. Once again, this requires a sample survey that probably demands actual trial observation. In most countries, the written record would probably not be adequate to allow a review of records. If observation is required, there is a question of how much observation is enough to make a judgment in each case - then a conclusion would have to be drawn about how costly it is to do such a survey and whether the information yielded justified the expense and time. Once again, citizens' group could perhaps be funded to handle the data collection.

It is very possible that the results of improved procedures will show up under other facets of this supporting objective. Before settling on one of the above, it would be useful to see if other indicators used elsewhere can capture the likely impact of improved procedures. For example, perhaps the indicators for improved investigative techniques will suffice to cover changes in investigations, and a Mission would not need to look at procedures being followed.

If establishing a **system of bail and pre-trial release** is the target, the following indicators are possibilities:

Indicator 5: Existence of a system for bail and pre-trial release (yes/no)

Indicator 6: Percentage of those accused of a first criminal offense or non-violent crime obtaining pre-trial release.

These are phased indicators, with the first showing progress in getting such a system established, and the second showing whether the system is working. The second indicator could be disaggregated, if useful, according to gender, ethnic group, or another socio-cultural characteristic. The second indicator requires a sample survey unless judicial statistics produce the data. Judicial statistics would at least have to produce the denominator, or numbers accused each year of a first offense or a non-violent one.

Result 7: Improved Investigative Techniques

The objective of strategies here is to increase reliance on forensic evidence rather than lean so heavily on testimony which may be very biased. A useful indicator could be:

Indicator 1: the percent of criminal trials in which forensic evidence is presented

The shift to a heavier reliance on physical evidence could disadvantage women bringing charges of rape and battery. USAID Missions need to be cognizant of this and look at the possible effect on women if they have such a strategy.

Result 7: Improved Prosecution

One way to gauge improvement is by looking at whether more cases go to trial, as in:

Indicator 1: the percentage of cases investigated that go to trial

If the percentage goes up over time, presumably prosecutors are doing a better job of preparing a case. However, this indicator does not tell us about the kind of job the prosecutor does in the court room. The only measure which the group could think of to demonstrate this is:

Indicator 2:   the percentage of criminal cases in which prosecutors perform satisfactorily

Once again a check list of what constitutes good performance is needed. This requires a sample survey conducted via actual observation of trials. A number of the indicators discussed thus far require observation of trials - it might be possible to join them all together in the same survey, to reduce data collection costs and time.

Result 8: Court management improved

One desired result is that the court knows where cases are at any given point in time. The indicator for this would be:

Indicator 1:   % cases for which the court can name the stage it is at without unreasonable delay

Unreasonable delay would have to be defined and probably could differ from one country to another. Another useful indicator reflective of some USAID strategies is:

Indicator 2: Judicial statistics are used to manage (fully/partially/not at all)

This indicator requires a checklist, including items such as using statistics to allocate cases. The three point scale could be elaborated into a five point scale if needed.

Supporting Objective 1.6: Improved Monitoring and Advocacy of Human Rights (including the demand for judicial reform)

Result 1: Increased investigation and prosecution of human rights violations

Indicator 1: 1) Number of cases of official (government) violations of human rights; 2) Percent of the total that are investigated; and 3) Percent of those investigated that are prosecuted.

Indicator 2: 1) Number of citizen (non-unofficial) violations of human rights; 2) Percent of the total that are investigated; and 3) Percent of those investigated that are prosecuted.

These indicators assume that 1) people are willing to report violations and are not afraid of repercussions; and 2) there is systematic tracking of rights violations. Indicators for this result might need to be at a somewhat earlier stage, if there is no human rights office and the objective is to create one.

Result 2: Increased advocacy and demand for justice sector reform

Indicator 1: Number of stories in the media on justice sector problems; or the number of stories developed by advocacy groups that kame it into the press on justice sector reform

Both of these indicators require a free press. The problem with them is that they may be sporadic and occur around isolated cases. The consistency of the pressure is also very important.

Indicator 2: Percent of members of influential groups who accept the need for reform

This requires a sample survey and can be disaggregated by group. It could provide very useful planning information for those trying to heighten the demand for reform.

Indicator 3: # public hearings on reform; # citizens' groups testifying at the hearings

Indicator 4: # citizens' groups taking part in official task forces on reform

Indicator 5: active network of citizens' groups operational

Indicator 5 is a qualitative indicator that requires an assessment of 1) breadth of representation; 2) quantity of activity; and 3) quality of activity. A checklist could be developed to lay out the most important elements.

Result 3: Improved tracking and reporting of violations by the media and NGOs

Indicator 1: Number of print media entities/radio stations/TV stations devoting significant attention to human rights reporting.

Indicator 2: Percent of population reached by the above entities.

The utility of these indicators depends on the existence of a free press. The parameters for what constitutes "significant attention" need to be defined. In most cases, we would probably end up counting print entities, since the mass media are often government-controlled. Indicator 2 would draw on data related to circulation and size of audience - most media entities know what the size of their audience is.

Another possibility is:

Indicator 3: a qualitative review of NGO monitoring and reporting

G D/G would need to work on a checklist or a way of operationalizing this review in order to achieve some consistency across USAID operating units.

Democracy and Governance Indicators

Free and Fair Elections

This is probably one of the most established areas of measurement in the Democracy and Governance (D&G) area, but there was not clear consensus on most indicators during the workshop. There was generally more consensus and confidence in the indicators at the macro level of "free and fair elections" than at the supporting objective level. The elections working group identified 'candidate' indicators for four of the five supporting objectives and the Agency Objective and 'brainstormed' about possible indicators for the fifth supporting objective. The working group was comprised of staff from USAID/Washington, USAID field missions, and NGOs and as a result, the discussion was rich and the insights diverse.

Process

As instructed, the elections group began with identification of indicators for the supporting objectives (the first two break-out sessions) and then worked on identifying Agency Objective indicators (the third break-out session).

The group began the discussion of indicators for each of the 'boxes' with a discussion of the meaning of the objective to ensure members understood it in the same way. Three supporting objectives were revised slightly in wording (this is discussed below).

The process utilized for selection of indicators was by 'vote' and discussion. Group members reviewed the set of both 'possible' indicators and mission-reported indicators provided in the workshop (Tables 1b and 2b), identifying those each thought were most relevant for measuring the objective as well as identifying any additional indicators that might be useful. The group then discussed the indicators that appeared to be most desirable and generally evaluated them against the criteria for good indicators (provided by workshop organizers). The group thus arrived at a subset of indicators it felt were good 'candidates' for measuring the objective.

The indicators below are clearly not the final word on measuring elections but do accurately reflect the progress of the group during the break-out sessions. Not all team members obviously agreed with all indicators. The group decided, wherever possible, to favor a "triangulation approach" in measurement, combining polling data, expert opinion, and normal statistical data (e.g. voters registered) given the various limitations of each type of data.

AGENCY OBJECTIVE 2.0: Free and Fair Elections

1. At least two independent parties participating in elections
2. Public opinion that elections are free, fair, and open (disaggregated by gender, ethnicity, etc.).
3. Public opinion that the electoral process was free and fair (registration, campaign, and elections) (disaggregated)
4. Rating of the elections by monitors (local and international) as free and fair
5. Major opposition party boycotting the elections.(yes/no)
6. Percentage of eligible voters voting
7. A peaceful transition takes place

8.   Parties accept electoral results (yes/no)

These indicators were largely drawn from the previously reported or suggested list of indicators prepared for the workshop. A considerable amount of time was spent on how to report the indicators (changes over time, yes/no, expert opinion). Participants were more apt to choose the indicators that most closely reflected the occurrence of events whereas the facilitators tried to emphasize indicators that would be measured and change over time, as opposed to yes/no, or one time event indicators.

There was the least amount of consensus around indicator 6--percentage of eligible voters voting. Some group members argued that USAID is only responsible for giving the countries all the tools for democracy, but citizens must choose to participate. Others agreed, noting that this would be a poor measure for the U.S. Other group members felt this was an important indicator in most developing countries and reflects an area where USAID has invested heavily--teaching people to get out and vote. The key issue here is manageable interest.

Indicator 7 represents the view taken by the group that the conduct of elections is more than what happens on election day. It involves the transference of power. The fact that a transition occurs peacefully, the group felt, was an important measure of election results.

The working group also discussed two other indicators: 'the percentage of votes garnered by the opposition' and 'the percentage of women/minorities winning political office' but decided that these indicators, while useful for a public-relations type of reporting, were really not something which USAID influences.

2.1   Creation of Impartial and Effective Laws and Regulations

1.   Law established with reasonable regulations regarding voter registration, voting, and political competing rules (expert opinion)
2.   Electoral system deemed fair by political parties, interest groups, and citizens.
3.   Creation of independent election commission that functions autonomously (yes/no), (expert opinion)
4.   Laws promulgated and accessible to the public

This supporting objective was slightly modified in wording from the original statement which was 'Creation of impartial and open electoral laws and regulations'. The working group more concisely reflects what USAID is doing in this area.

The working group initially spent a lot of time identifying those specific laws that it felt needed to be in place for free and fair elections to be held: elections are allowed to be held; parties are not excluded; all parties have equal opportunity to use the media; there is no poll tax or other means of discouraging participation, etc... This became a rather long list and the group agreed that these laws are really country-specific. The group agreed to a more 'generic' set of indicators to cover this. Using expert opinion and public polls, the group agreed it could get a general sense of the quality of the policy and regulatory framework for elections within different country environments. It should be noted, however, that the indicators identified are, however, binomial or qualitative.

2.2 More Impartial and Effective Electoral Administration

1. Electoral laws applied equally to all political parties (expert assessment)
2. Electoral results accepted by all political parties (% of people represented by these parties)
3. Local election monitors' assessments of the quality of elections
4. Election protests filed by candidates
5. Electoral results published on time (within given timetable)
6. % of eligible voters registered to vote (disaggregated by age (18-21), gender, ethnicity, and region)
7. Public confidence in the electoral tribunal

There were more than twenty-five indicators to choose from for this supporting objective. The ones that remained survived a lot of debate and are quite solid compared to those of some of the other objectives. The key challenge faced with this objective was reducing the number of indicators without a marginal reduction in knowledge of performance. Potentially three or four indicators could be represented by a composite indicator/index, "monitors" assessment of the quality of the elections," but this needs to be discussed.

2.3 Better Informed Electorate

1. % of voters knowledgeable of election issues
2. % of voters that understand the advantages of participatory democratic systems
3. % of voters knowledgeable of constitutional rights and responsibilities
4. % of voters knowledgeable of voting procedures
5. % of spoiled votes

There was some discussion in the working group about what 'knowledge' meant in this supporting objective - knowledge about the advantages of a democratic system, knowledge about the issues/candidates surrounding a given election, or so-called technical knowledge - how to actually vote. The group agreed that the type of knowledge USAID may be influencing depends on the activities it is undertaking and a given country's experience with voting. The working group discussed knowledge as being all three aspects and this idea is represented by the indicators identified.

Missions, it was noted, tended to use 'percent/number of people trained' as a measure of results in this area but the working group members agreed that such indicators were not direct measures of people's knowledge. However, the group also recognized that data collection could be an issue here.

The concern here, from a data collection standpoint, is that the indicators (except for #5) rely solely on polling data which can be an expensive effort. The working group recognized this. This category by its nature heavily favors polling, since it essentially is focused on acquisition of knowledge. There was a strong feeling that this approach was appropriate because these measures directly reflected the activities into which USAID invests its resources. The only non-polling measure--spoiled votes--was readily identified as a proxy measure but one felt by the groups' experts to be valid based on extensive field experience.

2.4 Improved Local Monitoring

1. # of election violations spotted/reported
2. Fair treatment for monitors whose findings have legal authority
3. Parallel vote count completed by non-partisan local monitors
4. Quality of the elections as determined by a non-partisan assessment

This supportive objective went under considerable transformation. First, the objective itself was modified to eliminate the international monitors in favor of better local monitoring as the key objective. Most of the indicators were completely new and largely suggested by the NGO representatives attending the workshop. Here it was felt there was no need for polling data, and there was a strong feeling that indicator 3--parallel vote count--was probably the most important. It was also suggested that an indicator such as the 'number of polls monitored' was an inexpensive proxy measure for this supporting objective.

2.5 Political Parties are more Effective (most tentative - really brainstorming).

1. Parties have platforms (yes/no)
2. Effective local structure in place (debates, supporters)
3. Parties are policy not personality oriented
4. Internal political party rules exist
5. Parties have the capacity to govern
6. Parties are representative of their constituents (demographics)
7. There exists coalition building

This supporting objective was modified slightly from 'Political parties more responsive to constituents'; the working group felt the current statement more accurately reflects the intent of USAID's programs.

These seven indicators are the results of a brainstorming session and have not, therefore, been discussed by the working group as intensively as those indicators for the other objectives. These really represent categories of sub-objectives rather than indicators. This category was least clear going into the workshop, and there probably was not even consensus on what the objective refers to. Therefore, it is not surprising that the measures and debate were preliminary. Both this objective and its indicators need more work and need to be based on actual USAID experience.

Next Steps:

The working group agreed that it would try to meet again to discuss the indicators for supporting objective #5 and any other outstanding issues. The members of the working group agreed that other democracy officers should be involved in the process of identifying candidate indicators. The group also expressed the need for some leadership in the area of national surveys; this would assist in ensuring that the data collected by missions is useful to both them and for USAID/W reporting purposes.

PROCEEDINGS FROM THE WORKING GROUP ON CIVIL SOCIETY

The following report provides a narrative overview of civil society break-out group discussions in Part I, including principal issues raised. And in Part II, the candidate indicators identified and put-forth by break-out group participants. In this latter discussion, candidate indicators are placed within a "finalized" strategy framework for civil society strengthening which emerged as a result of "post-workshop" discussions. Thus, rather than discussing indicators in relation to "supporting objectives" as initially carried out in the workshop, they are discussed in relation to "Agency Program Strategies." And where there were five supporting objectives discussed in the workshop, this finalized framework details seven Agency Program Strategy areas.

I.   BREAK-OUT GROUP DISCUSSIONS

A.   Summary Overview

The Civil Society Break-out group was composed of some 18 - 20 individuals on average for each of the two days of the workshop. The majority of participants were from within the Agency with good (active) representation from the field, primarily LAC Bureau, and other Regional and Central bureau officers. There were, however, only three to four representatives from the U.S. PVO/non-profit community, none of whom actively participated in the deliberations. It is worth noting the small number of these non-USAID participants that chose to join the civil society working group considering that of the Agency's four Sustainable Development Objectives, this particular one would seem to have the most direct relevance to them. In general, however, the **purpose** of the Break-out Sessions: "to bring together expertise from diverse sources to identify 'candidate' indicators for USAID's democracy and governance program," was achieved. The break-out sessions were helpful in refining the democracy results frame -- particularly at the middle and lower levels), providing feedback to G/DG and PPC on operational level indicators, and made a good start at defining Agency-wide indicators.

The majority of time spent in the three breakout sessions (Monday afternoon, Tuesday morning, and Tuesday afternoon) was devoted to reviewing, at the **Mission-level**, each of the five Supporting Objectives under the D/G objective of strengthening civil society. In the first two sessions the group spent significant time reviewing the "specific results anticipated" for each of the supporting objectives, looking particularly at their validity and relevance to the concerned SO. Much less time, relatively speaking, was spent assessing validity, feasibility, usefulness, etc., of the corresponding indicators that were attached to the anticipated result. The indicator worksheets reflect this fact. The group spent virtually no time reviewing the "mission indicators by Agency democracy objective" provided as part of the Workshop package. As it turned out, the nature of the assignment was such that reviewing these indicator sheets was less useful than evaluating the appropriateness of the "possible indicators" provided in Table 2. The complexity of the topic, i.e., identifying D/G indicators, the unfamiliarity of the topic by most participants, and time available for discussion all led the facilitator and resource persons to find alternative means for reaching the agreed upon outcome or objective of the break-out sessions.

In general, the "specific results anticipated" were found to be accurate reflections of desired outcomes contributing to the achievement of the supporting objectives with just a few exceptions which will be discussed in greater detail below. It should be noted that the group reviewed the first four supporting objectives, results and indicators in fairly great detail, while the last, (3.5)

more effective and independent media, was more cursorily handled. In general, the indicators were found to be fairly accurate measures for the specific results anticipated, although there were certainly a number that were dropped as well as several new ones added. As discussed immediately below, several new "supporting objectives" were also added to the five that were initially provided.

In fact, there was significant discussion in each of the three break-out sessions concerning the overall "strategy framework" for civil society. The issues centered on the lack of clarity related to the concepts of both the "supporting objectives" and "specific results anticipated." Follow-up meetings to the workshop held by G/DG and PPC have subsequently resolved the "framework" issues that emerged during the workshop, which were not just limited to the civil society break-out group, by renaming "Supporting Objectives" to "Agency Program Strategies." This change not only reflected the need to better relate and clarify this framework category to the Agency Objective (of civil society strengthening), but more fundamentally, reflected the tension that existed during the workshop break-out sessions between field Missions and the concerned Central (Global and PPC) bureaus over "whose framework, objectives and strategies" were being promoted. In short, were Missions being limited to the type of "objectives" they could pursue in their civil society programs to those defined and prescribed by G/DG and PPC; or were they (the supporting objectives) rather broad "strategy" areas that the Agency had distilled from previous work in this field, and used as guidelines by Missions with civil society objectives. The eventual, post-workshop change from "supporting objectives" to "program strategies" is an indication that Missions will be given some latitude in these broad program strategy areas to develop their programs according to local conditions and needs.

For the most part, the last of the breakout sessions was spent in a review of the Agency level civil society strengthening "framework" objective. For a number of reasons this session was much more contentious or confusing than the preceding two. The principal issue which group members found themselves grappling with in this last session was primarily conceptual in nature which distinguished it from the more operational disagreements which emerged during the first two sessions. While the focus in sessions one and two on supporting objectives, and the identification of "candidate" indicators, led the group to discuss them one by one with no reference to a broader more integrated view of civil society, at the framework objective level it became quickly apparent that participants were searching for a more holistic picture of civil society than in these earlier sessions. As expressed by one participant, the question was: "how would we know what a strong civil society looked like if we saw it?" and "What are its distinguishing characteristics and what activities, actors, processes, etc., would donors try to support to achieve this ideal?" In order to specify a set of indicators that identifies a "strengthened civil society," one needs to know what to measure. In short, the participants were looking for a **"conceptual framework"** rather than a framework objective that would guide the process of defining both specific results anticipated and their corresponding set of possible indicators.

The discussion which took place essentially led to two somewhat divergent viewpoints being placed before the group. The first was represented by CDIE, which had previously put forward a civil society conceptual framework as part of a study conducted for the Agency last year and publicly reviewed earlier this year. This framework primarily targeted and, to a large extent, equated civil society with those CSOs whose mission was to influence state decision or policy making. Conversely, the opposing view came from USAID field officers who felt that

consideration should be given to a far wider range of civil society actors -- and particularly those with whom Missions work in their normal sectoral programs -- than the more formalized "policy advocacy" organizations highlighted in the CDIE study.

The former position, which is essentially the one embodied in the Democracy and Governance Implementation Guidelines developed by PPC, is based on the premise that USAID must manage for results and, therefore, narrow its strategic focus to a smaller subset of organizations that has the capacity to make the greatest impact in consolidating democracy, particularly given decreasing funding levels. This is, however, an operational decision and does not really deal with the "framework" question of what an ideal civil society would look like. The discussion went back and forth for some time before the group returned to the task at hand which was to identify indicators at the framework objective level. The objective level indicators which the group arrived at are presented in section II below.

Suffice it to conclude here with the observation that for reporting purposes, the set of performance indicators and anticipated results at both the objective and supporting objective levels that the civil society group identified should advance the knowledge base in this area. It should be noted that they are, appropriately, a set of "operational" indicators designed to measure the performance of USAID interventions in this D/G framework objective area. What it appears the group was trying to express during the last session was both the need to broaden the range of civil society actors targeted by USAID and to do so within a broader conceptual framework capable of showing functional relationships within civil society and between it and other institutional actors involved in defining the democratic system.

B.   Principal Issues Raised

A number of conceptual and operational issues were raised by participants during the three break-out sessions on civil society. Several of them have been touched upon in passing in the overview section. The following discussion expands on a number of the more important of these issues and raises some additional ones. They are instructive, not necessarily as they relate to the development of specific "candidate indicators", but because they reflect the concerns of Democracy Officers at the field level who ultimately must make use of Agency implementation guidelines and undertake performance measurement tasks, both for their own programs and for overall Agency reporting requirements.

- ■   The civil society framework objective was discussed as both an ends and means to the overall Agency goal of "sustainable democracy." At a conceptual level all framework objectives were viewed as ends or desired outcomes of D/G support. Civil society, however, was viewed primarily by the Agency more in operational terms, as a means or "instrument" for achieving, not just the larger Agency D/G goal, but the other three framework objectives as well. The failure to make a distinction between a conceptual and operational definition of civil society has led to defining a set of "supporting objectives" and corresponding indicators which essentially relate to individual civil society organizations (means) and not civil society in a holistic or sectoral sense (a desired end). In practical terms, workshop participants debated whether the sum total of the five CS supporting objectives (and their anticipated results, and candidate indicators) added up to the framework CS objective; or, that the CS objective was in fact greater than the sum of the five supporting objectives with a different set of specific anticipated results and

indicators. The group ultimately felt that a strengthened CS did indeed have its own set of results and indicators and that the whole was, in fact, greater than the sum of the parts. This view seems to be reinforced by the decision taken following the workshop to change supporting objectives to program strategies, which cover only a several of the total possible strategies available to affect civil society strengthening.

■ As noted above, participants discussed the result of treating civil as an operational strategy rather than a larger conceptual area of support. The Agency's decision to become more strategic in its targeting of assistance to strengthen civil society, has meant isolating a narrow sliver of CSOs for support. By providing assistance to this narrow sliver which was defined as only those organizations which engage in public policy advocacy, the assumption was made that USAID was strengthening civil society in an inclusive sense and therefore contributing to "sustainable democracy." The problem noted by participants, however, was that such an instrumentalist, or operational approach, meant that civil society organizations were contributing indirectly to the Agency D/G goal through the other three framework objectives and not directly, thus lowering its status to a supporting rather than framework objective.

II.   PROPOSED CANDIDATE INDICATORS: STRENGTHENED CIVIL SOCIETY

The following discussion presents the candidate indicators Agency Objective Three: strengthened civil society as identified by participants in the civil society break-out group. This task is undertaken, as noted above, within a finalized civil society strategic framework which represents both break-out group recommendations, as well as the newly developed "democracy strategic framework" which emerged as a result of G/DG and PPC follow-up sessions subsequent to the workshop. The basic change made as a result of these recommendations was to rename "supporting objectives," **Agency Program Strategies**, and an increase from five supporting objectives as discussed in the workshop to seven program strategies, post-workshop. The following presentation thus describes these seven program strategy areas with corresponding "anticipated results" and candidate indicators. It is preceded, however, with a presentation of anticipated results and indicators for the Agency Objective 3, strengthened civil society to which the program strategies contribute.

A.   Agency level Framework Objective 3: Strengthened Civil Society

A strong civil society serves to limit the state's discretionary exercise of authority, and particularly its potential abuse of power, thus leading to increased accountability, responsiveness, and transparency; fundamental elements of good or effective governance. At the same time, civil society has an important role to play in promoting increased citizen participation in national governance matters, including both the formulation and implementation of public policy...the notion of shared or democratic governance. A dense (in numbers) and diverse civil society provides individual citizens with a wide range of institutional and organizational forms through which to join in shared endeavor and collective action, whether problem-solving or promoting common interests. Finally, civil society contributes to the development of a democratic (civic) culture by offering more opportunities for citizen participation in national and local political life than are available from either state institutions or political parties alone. In short, civil society provides both demand-side and supply-side functions, i.e., watchdog, oversight and monitoring

of state institutions on the one hand; and the provision of good or democratic governance from the organizations, including local self-governing associations, that compose it, on the other.

The group came up with three new "specific results anticipated" to replace the original four that were proposed in Table 2c. The fifth listed in Table 2c, free flow of information from independent and diverse sources, remains the same. The following presents the new specific anticipated results, indicators, and means of verification.

ANTICIPATED RESULT 1: Increased citizen/societal participation/influence in public policy making

Candidate Indicators:

* Number of changes made to government policy as a result of civil society advocacy, participation, etc.

* Number of draft legislative initiatives introduced and voted upon by the legislative branch in which there was societal participation in the deliberative process

* Number of parliamentary committee meetings held in which there was citizen/societal participation

* Number of executive branch commissions and councils established which provide a forum for state - society dialogue

* Percent of legislative initiatives passed with CSO lobbying

* Number or percent of legislative debates attended by CSOs

* Number of new government/CSO consultative mechanisms established

Means of Verification:

* Analysis of legislative process to determine citizen/societal influence (Expert judgement and analysis)

* Analysis of executive branch fora created or existing in which there is societal participation

* Freedom house

ANTICIPATED RESULT 2: Broadened or increased citizen participation in civil society organizations

Candidate Indicators:

* Increased diversity of CSOs

*   Increased number of independent and voluntary organizations (CSOs)

*   Number of new consortia, umbrella organizations, federations, coalitions formed (horizontal and vertical integration

Means of Verification:

*   Longitudinal studies

*   Review of inventory(s) of government ministry(s) responsible for NGOs, cooperatives, labor unions etc.

*   Review of inventories from NGO Umbrella organizations, cooperatives, labor unions etc.

*   Survey groups of people and ask them membership affiliation/what types of organizations to which they belong

ANTICIPATED RESULT 3: Changes and broadening of democratic (civic) culture, values, beliefs, knowledge (and practices).

Candidate Indicators:

Missions participating in the civil society group stated that they have such indicators already developed; however, the following indicators were noted:

*   Increased tolerance for dissent, diverging points of view, and CSOs representing minorities.

*   Increased practice of democratic principles and processes (e.g., voting for board members, participation in decision-making) and good governance (e.g., transparency, accountability and responsiveness) within CSOs.

Means of Verification

*   Through knowledge, attitudes and practice (KAP) surveys

*   Through public opinion polling

*   Development of Composite scale

ANTICIPATED RESULT 4: Free flow of information from independent and diverse sources

Candidate Indicators:

*   Degree of media censorship (qualitative indicator)

*   Percent of media outlets privately owned (either for-profit private outlets or non-profit CSO outlets)

*   Degree of opposing opinions and viewpoints expressed

B.   Agency Program Strategies Supporting Framework Objective

3.1   Promoting Legislation that Encourages Organization and Operations of CSOs

Prerequisites for the emergence and growth of a strong civil society are the body of fundamental laws and enabling legislation that permits the right of voluntary association, promotes voluntarism, and ensures autonomy from state interference. Freedom of association, speech and assembly are fundamental laws, normally embodied in a country's constitution, that form the basis of a democratic system and condition the emergence of civil society. While fundamental law creates the basic macro-political or "systemic" framework within which civil society operates, specific enabling legislation pertaining to the regulation, fiscal requirements and benefits, and general legal rights and obligations of civil society organizations can either reinforce or thwart the intent of fundamental law. Equally important are the numerous laws that govern a country's economic and social affairs and that directly impact the ability of a wide range of CSOs such as cooperatives, resource user groups, women's organizations, service providers, etc., to engage in the provision or delivery of goods and services to their members or clients. Enabling legislation in these "sectoral" areas (e.g., labor and commercial codes, land tenure and property rights, family, health and education laws) is as critical in determining the degree to which non-state actors can participate in governance matters as does "systemic" or fundamental law in permitting their existence altogether. To achieve this objective, USAID has used strategies including policy dialogue, and at times tying or conditioning aid to specific legislative changes either of a systemic or sectoral nature. Where fundamental human and civil rights guarantees exist, USAID has directly supported civic organizations capable of engaging the state and demanding more favorable laws be enacted.

ANTICIPATED RESULT 1:   Legislative Framework: Ease of establishing and operating CSOs (Absence of legislation restricting formation of CSOs)

Candidate Indicators:

*   Existence of laws protecting freedom of association, assembly and speech.

*   Mechanisms either judicial or regulatory that provide CSOs with means for redress against restrictive legislation.

*   Are existing laws consistently applied by concerned state agency regulators.

*   What are the perceptions of CSOs concerning legislative framework governing CSOs.

*   Are concerned laws adequately communicated to and known by CSOs.

ANTICIPATED RESULT 2:   Financial Framework: Incentives, policies and/or legislation that encourages formation and operation of CSOs

Candidate Indicators:

*   Are the "transaction costs" to form and operate CSOs onerous or supportive (e.g., rent-seeking and corrupt practices).

*   Do tax incentives exist to encourage citizens to contribute voluntarily to CSOs.

*   Are exemptions on taxes (e.g., duty-free exonerations) provided for voluntary organizations, CSOs or NGOs.

ANTICIPATED RESULT 3:   Lack of bureaucratic and administrative impediments to CSO formation and operations (new result)

*   Length of time to register a CSO (indicates degree of difficulty in official or legal registration).

*   What are the total financial costs for registration (indicates incentive or disincentive)

*   Are there other impediments to registration such as geographic location where registration must take place (e.g., centralized or decentralized) or gender requirements.

*   Are requirements for CSOs following registration onerous (e.g., periodicity of reporting requirements, audits and evaluations).

*   What are the opinions of CSOs concerning impediments or incentives to CSO formation and operations.

ANTICIPATED RESULT 4:   Protection of CSOs from state (political) interference

Candidate Indicators:

*   Harassment of CSO officers and Media owners and journalists.

*   Number of violent acts against CSO staff, members, media owners, journalists, etc. in past year.

*   Number of CSOs and media outlets closed down in past year.

*   Number of complaints filed with human rights organizations.

*   Number of legal proceedings taken against state executive agencies related to CSOs.

3.2 Strengthening Civil Society's Oversight of State Institutions

The classic role attributed to civil society from its earliest conception and actual practice has been as a countervailing force to that of the state, protecting individual human and civil rights through collective non-state action. Closely related to this "watchdog" role of ensuring respect for fundamental liberties and freedoms is civil society's role in the oversight of the state's governance performance, particularly in the allocation and management of public resources. To achieve good or effective governance, state institutions must be transparent, responsive and

accountable in the conduct of public business. State institutions either undertake the supply of good governance voluntarily, including developing and instituting internal systems and processes for oversight, or it is undertaken by civil society itself through its capacity to demand good governance through civic action and education. USAID has supported this strategy objective by providing assistance to human and civil rights groups, election monitoring and poll-watcher organizations, and civic organizations engaged in policy analysis and advocacy, etc.

ANTICIPATED RESULT 1: Increased capability of CSOs to ensure state institutions practice good governance

Candidate Indicators:

* Number of CSO prepared studies, analyses and assessments that are widely disseminated in society and government.

* Increased informational openness and transparency of executive and legislative branch policy and decision-making processes, including the allocation and management of public resources.

* Increased accountability of state institutions for the impact of their public policy decisions.

* Increased responsiveness to citizen requests for information or redress of state actions.

* Whether there are publications of parliamentary debate of policies and their frequency.

* Whether there are publications of the budget and budgetary expenditures and their frequency.

* Frequency of legal challenges to legislation and/or public policies.

* Number of CSOs directly engaging the state over issues of public governance performance.

ANTICIPATED RESULT 2: Significant decrease in the state's discretionary use of authority and particularly its abuse of state power

Candidate Indicators:

* Decrease in the use of executive decrees.

* Decrease in the report of human rights violations, particularly by police and military.

* Decrease in "extra-budgetary" expenditures reported.

3.3 Promoting More Effective Management of CSOs

Increasing the capacity of CSOs to more effectively undertake civic action functions -- including monitoring and oversight of state institutions, increasing citizen participation in policy making, providing improved services to members or clients, etc. -- is critical not only to democratic consolidation but to the credibility and legitimacy of civil society itself and the individual actors which compose it. Enhancing CSO capacity to undertake these functions requires a variety of institution building interventions, including generic development management (e.g., strategic planning, financial management, monitoring and evaluation) and those related to substantive civic action skills (e.g., policy analysis, formulation, and advocacy; mediation and conflict resolution; and civic education strategies and curriculum development). USAID has assisted NGOs and civic organizations through the provision of technical assistance and training, exchanges and study tours for CSO staff, and grant funding to cover limited operating costs. In short, traditional NGO capacity building activities expanded to cover the more inclusive notion of civil society and the specific skills and expertise that CSOs must acquire if they are to function in the political arena.

ANTICIPATED RESULT 1:   Financial viability

Candidate Indicators:

*   Percent of funds from independent sources supporting CSO operations and programs

*   Percent of funds coming from members

*   Percent of funds recovered from members or clients that contribute to financing CSO operating costs

*   Percent of funds coming from donors and the diversification (i.e., number) of donors.

*   Percent (extent to which) of funds generated by CSO that cover overall operating and program costs

ANTICIPATED RESULT 2:   Transparency of CSO management

Candidate Indicators:

*   Organizational records available

*   Financial records regularly audited by independent source

*   Completeness of meeting minutes

ANTICIPATED RESULT 3:   Increased demand for CSO services

Candidate Indicators:

*   Number of clients being served by CSO

*   Number of requests by government for CSOs to participate in service delivery

*   Number of donors funding CSOs to undertake services formerly provided by government

*   Number of clients requesting CSOs for services

3.4   Increasing Internal CSO Democratic Governance Practice

While the promotion of democratically-run CSOs is obviously important, it has often been viewed as a secondary priority to that of enhancing CSO management effectiveness during the democratic transition phase and even in the early stages of consolidation. Ensuring that human rights or elections monitoring is conducted effectively by non-state actors has thus been more important than whether the particular CSO practiced broad based participation in internal decision-making matters. Similarly, it should not be assumed that CSOs practice the same values and principles of democracy and good governance that they are expected to promote in the wider society and to which they hold state institutions accountable. This is particularly true in countries where (i) the predominant political model has been authoritarian with the centralization and personalization of power, and patron - client relationships defining social interaction; and (ii) societal cleavages based on race, ethnicity, region, gender, religion, etc., have been widely in evidence and form the basis of social relations. There is every reason to believe that the same traditional values, practices and cleavages that continue to permeate the wider society will also be in evidence in what are predominately newly emerging CSOs. This pertains equally to smaller public interest or civic organizations as it does to larger, mass-based membership organizations. The tendency to revert to that which is most familiar, even if negative, is a pattern frequently observed in many CSOs in newly emerging democracies. As a strategy objective, USAID has provided technical assistance, in many cases, utilizing U.S. PVOs to conduct strategic management assessments and reviews with CSOs. The larger issue is whether USAID missions make the democratic practice a criteria in the selection of CSOs for support in their country D/G programs.

ANTICIPATED RESULT 1:   Increased member/client participation in decision-making

Candidate Indicators:

*   Number of members voting on policy initiatives

*   Number of sub-committees of board of directors and members per sub-committee dealing with policy formulation

*   Number of decentralized units of the CSO involved in decision and policy making

*   Number of consultations held with clients to gain their input into policies/decisions which affect them

*   Types and numbers of mechanisms which CSO employs to gain member/client input (e.g., evaluations, open fora)

ANTICIPATED RESULT 2:   Representativeness of membership

Candidate Indicators:

*   Elections of governing entities held at regular intervals

*   Degree of turnover of CSO officers/board members

*   Officers/management reflect composition of management

ANTICIPATED RESULT 3:   Accountability and responsiveness of officers/board members and management body to members and/or clients

Candidate Indicators:

*   Types and number of mechanisms through which members and clients can convey feedback on policies and services provided by CSO

*   Number of responses by CSO to member, client or general public inquiries

*   Time between member, client or general public inquiries and CSO response

*   Frequency of CSO reporting, including financial reporting to members/clients, government, and donors

3.5   Increasing Participation in Policy Formulation and Implementation

Democratic or shared governance implies societal participation in both public policy making and its implementation. CSOs provide the means by which ordinary citizens can affect policy decisions that are made in the public realm; and actually carry out the performance of public governance functions that have hitherto been the exclusive reserve of the state. USAID has used several approaches to promote increased civil society participation in policy making and the performance of public governance functions (e.g., health and education service delivery, management of natural resources) including policy dialogue (and conditionalities where appropriate) with host governments, and direct assistance to CSOs to increase their capacity in policy formulation and service delivery. PVO/NGO "Umbrella" support projects, utilizing an intermediary to provide grant funding and technical assistance to NGOs has been a traditional mechanism used to increase service delivery in NGO sectoral programs, and has been increasingly used to support more democracy-related civil society activities.

ANTICIPATED RESULT 1:   Increased direct methods undertaken to influence public policy

Candidate Indicators:

*   Number of direct actions (e.g., petitions, participation on presidential commissions) taken in support or opposition to government (executive branch) policies.

*   Number CSOs brought into the legislative process (e.g., testifying before congressional committees).

*   Number of policy papers and draft legislation prepared on national and local issues.

* Number of legal cases brought by CSOs before courts (constitutional, criminal and civil) challenging policies and laws.

* Number of actual policies and/or laws changed as a result of CSO lobbying/advocacy.

* Number of reforms/reformist actions taken

* Number and types of fora in which CSOs engage state institutions in policy debate

* Increased and more diverse media coverage of public debates

ANTICIPATED RESULT 2:   Increased proportion of population involved in influencing public policy

Candidate Indicators:

* Percent of population represented by CSOs

* Number of CSOs taking positions on public issues

ANTICIPATED RESULT 3:   More minority groups involved

Candidate Indicators:

* Number of CSOs representing women's interests.

* Number of CSOs representing ethnic and religious minorities.

ANTICIPATED RESULT 4:   CSOs join to promote/oppose specific policies or laws

Candidate Indicators:

* Number of coalitions formed to promote/oppose specific policies/legislation

* Number of networks, umbrella organizations existing that represent groupings of CSOs

* Number of cross-sectoral coalitions and alliances which include CSOs

* Diversity of coalitions formed

* Duration of coalitions

3.6   Broadening the Acceptance of Democratic (civic) Values

A major function of civil society is to spread democratic values and good governance practices so widely that they become the accepted way of conducting relations between individuals, groups, state and non-state actors, etc. This would include such norms as tolerance and respect for diversity (of views, cultures, race, ethnicity), inclusivity, broad based participation, transparency,

accountability, responsiveness, etc. As a strategy objective, USAID has extensively funded CSOs throughout the world to undertake civic education through mass media informational campaigns; tailor-made programs targeting specific groups that live outside the traditional forms of the mass media; and supporting the development of civic education curriculum in the formal education system. In addition, democratic governance values and practices are best learned in the local self-governing associations that citizens form to address their common problems and advance their shared interests. Particularly, through USAID-financed sectoral programs and projects, such groups as resource users (e.g., grazing associations, water user associations), service providers (e.g., parent - teacher associations, community health committees) and economic interest groups (e.g., primary level cooperatives, credit unions, women's income generating groups) have been provided technical assistance and grant funding to increase their capacity for more effective management and the practice and supply of democratic governance.

ANTICIPATED RESULT 1:   Citizens show more tolerance for minority groups

Candidate Indicators:

*   Percent of citizens polled expressing positive attitudes towards minorities

*   Number or percent of anti-minority incidents reported

*   Degree of participation of minority in public life

ANTICIPATED RESULT 2:   Women participate fully in social, economic and political life

Candidate Indicators:

*   Number of women in elective offices

*   Number of women appointed to leadership positions in executive branch agencies

*   Number of laws restricting women's employment opportunities or access to commercial loans

ANTICIPATED RESULT 3:   Civic education actively pursued

Candidate Indicators:

*   Number or percent of population attending civic education classes

*   Civic education included in school curriculum

*   Number of CSOs providing civic education

ANTICIPATED RESULT 4:   Citizens acceptance of democratic principles and governance practices increased

Candidate Indicators:

* Percent of citizens who adhere to democratic principles and good governance practices.

* Percent of citizens who understand constitutional responsibilities.

* Number of citizens who belong to and participate in self-governing associations at both the local and national levels.

3.7 Promoting a More Independent and Effective Media

The private media provides society with an independent network of public communications connecting individual citizens and their CSOs in the public realm where policy making takes place and governance decisions are made. In practical terms, the private media undertakes a watchdog or oversight function vis-a-vis state institutions and their performance of public governance by ensuring transparency and informational openness; and as independent sources of information which citizens can utilize to analyze public issues and participate knowledgeably in the policy dialogue; and, when necessary, act collectively to advance their chosen positions. As with all sectors of civil society, the greater the diversity of the private media, the more choices in terms of both information sources and points of view available to citizens thus providing them with the tools to make reasoned decisions on public issues. While the institution of the independent media performs many of the demand functions expected of civil society -- more effectively than most CSOs in newly emerging democracies -- it technically does not belong to this non-state realm because its basic organizing principle is one of profit, whereas the institutions and organizations of civil society are voluntary and non-profit in nature. USAID, normally in conjunction with the USIS, supports the private media in a number of ways, but primarily through training of individual journalists and the owners of media outlets. Rarely do private media outlets receive direct financial assistance; rather, USAID often supports common facilities (e.g., computers, printers, international news services) that benefit all journalists and/or media outlets.

ANTICIPATED RESULT 1:　　　Media represents all segments of society

Candidate Indicators:

* Number or percent of media outlets owned or operated by minority groups

* Number or percent of women in media

* Media content including views and opinions reflects wider society

ANTICIPATED RESULT 2:　　　Government control of media is limited

Candidate Indicators:

* Number or percent of privately-owned media outlets.

* Percent of media outlets independent of government funding.

*   Degree to which materials and facilities are distributed equally or to which there is equitable access.

ANTICIPATED RESULT 3:   Open access to different points of view

Candidate Indicators:

*   Degree of media censorship

*   Number of media outlets closed down or suspended

*   Number of journalists harassed or jailed

*   Percent of news coverage expressing opposing views

ANTICIPATED RESULT 4:   Media adhere to professional standards

Candidate Indicators:

*   Number or percent of journalists professionally trained.

*   Recognized professional association develops and holds members to code of conduct

*   Libel laws enforced.

*   Investigative reporting free and unbiased.

Democracy Indicators Workshop
Breakout Group Summary: MORE ACCOUNTABLE GOVERNANCE

Background and Process:

Four Supporting Objectives are identified under the Agency Objective 'More Accountable Governance': (1) Increased local government participation in basic government functions; (2) Improved mechanisms to ensure transparency & guard against corruption, including involvement by CSOs; (3) Increased civilian control over military and police forces; (4) More effective and independent legislatures. These supporting objectives are each quite broad and, although falling under the general heading of 'governance', some preliminary discussion within the group on terms of reference and prioritization occurred.

Approximately 15-20 people selected the 'Accountable Governance' break-out group. This made facilitation, discussion of ideas, and consensus-building, at times, extremely rushed. Representation in the group was diverse: four field missions, each regional bureau, and a number of people from outside USAID participated.

Identification of Mission/Supporting Objective Indicators: given the relatively short time frame available to discuss this level of indicator, the group first discussed and then agreed on an order of priority for consideration; making local government and legislatures the first priorities and

Civil-Military the last. There was some concern over the relevance of the civil-military supporting objective to the More Accountable Governance objective - some felt it belonged under the Rule of Law Objective, others held that since it was often within the purview of the executive branch it should remain within governance.

The group began by 'brainstorming', and then identifying as many likely indicators as possible. These were noted on the flip charts and once completed, were reviewed and discussed by the group and a refined set of indicators was agreed upon. The extent to which this was done varied by Objective. The criteria for good indicators, as identified in the break-out session worksheet, were reviewed against the indicators on an on-going basis.

Within two Supporting Objectives, the group came to a consensus on some possible indicators. As a result, 3 possible candidate indicators have been identified for the local government Supporting Objective and 10 have been identified for the legislatures Supporting Objective. More information on the discussion of each of these is provided below.

Identification of Agency Objective Indicators: one break-out session was devoted to the identification of possible indicators for the Agency Objective. For this set, the group identified a set of possible indicators and categorized them under general headings.

The following discusses the indicators and process used by each Objective.

Indicators:

SUPPORTING OBJECTIVE 4.1: Increased local government participation in basic government functions

The group began by defining the important areas of activity related to this objective. Three were identified and agreed to:

> * enabling environment: defined as the context/regulations which allow local government to form, gain authority, and function, and includes the following aspects:
>> legal/constitutional
>> financial/fiscal authority
>> socio-cultural environment (people demand and appreciate local government)
> * capacity: defined as the ability of local government to function:
>> to serve people
>> to work with governments above them and NGOs
>> to provide services
>> requires trained staff, systems, tools, resources
> * effectiveness/responsiveness/participation: defined as the functioning of local governments in service delivery and inclusion of citizens (the group recognized that there is some overlap between this and capacity building but was not able to resolve the issue). However, there was general agreement that this area included:
>> breadth of participation in local government: traditional and non-traditional
>> devolution of authority
>> extent? (resources, relationship to higher level)
>> how officials were selected

effectiveness/responsiveness (resolving non-judicial disputes; services/knowing
   needs)
enabling environment/capacity building
distinctions depending on stage (transition, post-transition, consolidation)]

Time permitted indicators for the first two areas to be discussed in greater detail than the third
category.

After brainstorming about a set of possible indicators (identified in Annex A), three candidate
indicators emerged. These represent a consensus among the members of the group:

(1) percent of national revenue allocated to local government
(2) amount (%) of locally-collected revenue in local government budget (closely related
    to #1)
(3) passage of legal, fiscal, and procurement reforms that empower local government

SUPPORTING OBJECTIVE 4.4: More effective and independent legislatures

The group agreed upon 10 possible indicators for this objective. The working group was careful
to identify indicators that it felt had broad applicability across countries. These are as follows:

Legislative Effectiveness:

(1) percent of citizens who believe they are being represented by the legislature
(2) percent of membership-based organizations that believe they can access, be heard by
    the legislature
(3) extent to which legislature uses information provided by research units
(4) number of public hearings held
(5) percent of laws passed that have been significantly amended by the legislature
(6) number/type of NGO groups working with the legislature: providing testimony to..,
    giving information to.., helping draft information on...
(7) legislature is fulfilling its constitutional responsibilities

Legislative Independence:

(1) number of bills (introduced/enacted) by (minority party members/members of
    Parliament)
(2) number of sanctions: identified (hearings); made (adopted); accepted by the Executive
(3) number of recommendations: identified (hearings); made (adopted); accepted by the
    Executive

AGENCY OBJECTIVE: More Accountable Governance

In the one break-out session devoted to identifying higher-order or Agency objective indicators,
the working group spent much of its time 'brainstorming' about possible indicators for this level.
Thirty such indicators were identified. Some of these indicators represent ideas or concepts
rather than true measures. The working group members then decided to 'group' the 30 indicators
into some categories and this is presented below (in no particular order of importance).

The group did not have sufficient time to come to consensus on these indicators, thus, this list is large and would serve as a starting point for a discussion of the most appropriate candidate indicators.

Local government public services and revenues

(1) percent of countries where 50% of public revenues are locally generated and controlled
(2) number of regional and local governments providing social and public services previously provided by the central government; % of citizens receiving them

Rate of growth of democratic institutions

(1) rate of growth of democratic institutions (Parliament, NGOs, etc., trade unions)

Citizen perception of responsiveness of governments to citizens/minorities

(1) citizens are treated as customers of government/government personnel
(2) number of citizens who believe they have a voice in the decisions that affect their lives, either individually or through associations formed around common interests (by gender)
(3) ethnic/religious minorities who feel their rights are protected and promoted

Citizen awareness/participation in decision-making - individuals, NGOs, collectively

(1) percent of communities in a country where X% of resources are being efficiently used for projects by voting citizens
(2) number/percent of citizens who individually or collectively have been in contact with an MP or staff member (or legislature)
(3) percent of countries whose systems of governance provide avenues for participatory public policy making at the lowest level appropriate
(4) number/percent of governments (at all levels) that have active systems in place for publishing/disseminating information
(5) increased active public debate on key issues/decisions of government and extent of NGO involvement in debate

Relative independence/power of legislature vis-a-vis other branches

(1) number of independent-functioning legislatures
(2) number of countries in which legislatures and judiciaries hold significant power in relation to the executive branch (a balance of power among the three branches)
(3) percent of countries with X% of legislation (a) drafted and (b) enacted by the legislative branch rather than the executive branch
(4) percent of countries where the national budget is controlled by the legislature
(5) extent to which legislatures have and use the authority to review/approve government decisions, budgets, appointments, etc.

U.S. policy/national interest objectives

(1) number of American companies experiencing greater access/trade to/with developing country markets without resorting to corruption/pay off to government officials
(2) percent reduction in anti-American activities (including terrorism) from non-democracies and transitioning developing countries
(3) number of conflicts in which the US has been engaged

Movement toward democracy

(1) number of countries operating under constitutions that represent social compacts (fundamental law)
(2) percent of actual government that have increased efforts toward democratic governance (including experiments, dialogues, discussions) that didn't previously exist)
(3) number of countries in which highest executive branch officials are chosen by national election

Money saved for corruption/inefficiency

(1) number of dollars saved from corruption, efficiency as a result of executive oversight, legislative oversight and independent audits (could be % of national budget)

Officials prosecuted

(1) number of countries in which high-level officials are prosecuted, convicted, sentenced for corrupt practices

Executive control of military budget

(1) number of countries in which executive branch has control of military budget

Next Steps:

The working group identified two next steps at the workshop:

(1) Review the 'brainstorming' list of indicators for the Agency Objective to identify those which would best serve as good candidate indicators. In determining this list, the criteria for good indicators identified for the break-out sessions would be considered.

(2) The group will also work to identify at least some possible indicators for the two Supporting Objectives which were not addressed during the workshop. This was identified as a second order priority.

Follow-up Work Completed:

The Accountable Governance working group met once since the workshop thus far. At this meeting, the working group again discussed the various definitions and uses for indicators, an issue that was continually raised within the group during the workshop. The working group

agreed that there continues to be confusion about the various 'levels' of indicators and their uses. At the follow-up meeting, the working group identified three types of indicators: reporting; management; and evaluative. Indicators for each of these are different and serve different purposes. The working group feels the set of indicators proposed at the workshop does not clearly fall into one or another category but rather spans all three. The working group also feels strongly that the confusion about indicators also exists in the field.

In an effort to clarify these distinctions and identify a cogent set of indicators for the Agency's analytical framework, the working group has proposed three activities: (1) a clear articulation of the distinction between the types of indicators and their various uses; (2) the development of a methodology for identifying indicators for each of these areas; and (3) the development of a practical guide for field missions for evaluating various indicators and their utility (this includes the possible field-testing of some proposed indicators). The working group will solicit some assistance in this effort and will proceed as soon as such assistance is acquired.

ANNEX A
BRAINSTORMING INDICATORS FOR LOCAL GOVERNMENT

    (1)   Citizens form local voluntary associations without outside direction

    (2)   Number/type of citizens who participate in town meetings

    (3)   Number/% of citizens who participate in local elections; % who believe that local elections make a difference; participation in monitoring local elections

    (4)   Number of activities/projects collaboratively designed, planned, funded and implemented by local government

    (5)   Percent of local projects initiated in response to citizens' felt needs

    (6)   Percent of local government officials (elected and non-elected) with skills in accounting/budgeting

    (7)   (possible idea worth pursuing) Organizational Capacity Index: strategic, technical, administrative, financial management, communications

Capacity-type indicators

    (9)   Types of services being provided by local government

    (10) Percent of population receiving X priority services through local government

    (11) Percent of local government officials who know their job...

    (12) Extent to which local governments are providing the services they have chosen to provide

    (13) Degree to which local government is providing/ensuring the provision of services identified as priority needs by citizens (1. process in place, 2. services...several levels of indicators

    (14) Degree to which local government is providing/ensuring the provision of services identified as priority needs by citizens

    (15) Percent of citizens receiving X, Y, Z services from local government (#, breadth, quality of services)

CONCLUSIONS AND LESSONS LEARNED

Performance Measurement:

*   There is a difference between performance measurement and evaluation (such as the CDIE studies). Evaluation helps in the development of a strategy, tells one how to approach a particular area and what the sequence of program inputs or approaches might be. It helps one identify how the process works. Performance measurement tells one, once an objective/strategy has been decided on, how well intended results are being achieved. That is a very different construct. One asks the question of how well one is accomplishing the results one set up to do.

*   USAID needs to be able to demonstrate whether all the money and time it is putting into this effort on democracy is going to pay off, whether it is work well done, and time well spent. This is a difficult process - it is hard to get a common understanding of which level is operating and the validity of certain indicators. But it has to be done.

Roles and Responsibilities:

*   Project officers are often not M&E experts and doing M&E activities on top of project duties is onerous. How can this best be dealt with? One suggestion was that each mission have a resident M&E expert to assist staff. Another suggestion was that project staff acquire these skills, that M&E becomes part of what project managers do. This will require, however, training in M&E skills.

*   NGOs also need to be trained, USAID needs to work with them on a sustained basis.

Levels of Indicators:

*   The other side to the identification of indicators is the issue of accountability. We are looking to develop a consensus about how to measure most or more of what we all appear to be doing in democracy. Yet what gets produced will be included in this ultimate attempt to develop agency-level indicators for describing how AID is doing in democracy. But as one gets to higher and higher levels of abstraction, especially in an area such as democracy which is difficult to define and ephemeral anyway, measuring and identifying what AID has done is more and more difficult. The higher the level of abstraction, the further away results are from USAID's intervention. That can be dangerous.

*   (response to the above) The issue of indicators leading to higher and higher levels of abstraction for which AID cannot really be accountable is an important one. The purpose of the workshop was to deal with mission level indicators in their own terms first and then see whether they could be "rolled up" to results at the Agency level.

*   Process is also important, especially in democracy, where some activities are really just beginning and the sector is complex. For example, the training of judges. Getting training programs in place comes first and this is an important first step. One needs to have a way to monitor these results as well.

*   "Rolling Up" and comparing results across countries through the use of common indicators may be appropriate for some areas of democracy, but not for others.

*   The goal of the workshop is not to come up with simply one indicator that is appropriate for each result, but rather to give a basis for providing guidance to missions about what are the various types of indicators that would be appropriate for this result. USAID cannot have hundreds of different indicators, but also doesn't want just a few either.

*   There was concern about the issue of 'mandating' indicators. The purpose of the workshop and the indicators identified was not that they would be mandated, particularly not at the strategy level. The idea was expressed that missions struggle with the issues of measurement in democracy and would probably welcome a list of preferred indicators and some joint thinking about what the advantages of particular indicators are versus the disadvantages of some others.

*   Concern was raised that by identifying a limited set of indicators, indicators may 'drive' the system. The comment was made that by saying a mission has a particular kind of result and here are some preferred indicators for measuring, does not suggest that there is a cookie cutter approach. It merely says that some results are common, it does not say that the strategy by which you will get there will be the same. It simply says, here are some ways to grapple with whether you are going in that direction or not.

*   This process takes time. It represents a change for everyone.   It's   a   change   in terminology; it's a change in how one looks at what one does. It means becoming accountable for what one does and how money is spent. But the process is as important as the outcome, in some cases more important. The buying-in and understanding of everybody is crucial. And one has to be open to revisiting this often for that is essential to the process.

*   There is an important need to disaggregate this information. If one does not disaggregate, for example, by minority groups or by gender, one is not going to get a handle on who is benefitting and who is not. If there is an increase in the number of voters going to polls - who are they? Does this really mean the program is reaching or is it just more of the same people voting. It is important to know who is and is not benefitting.

Data Collection:

*   Perhaps something like public opinion polling should be centrally supported.

*   Leadership by the Agency in the area of national surveys is needed.

*   Time and energy are necessary to identify indicators and collect data. This is a long process which requires time, resources and energy. One needs to be realistic about the resources involved.

*   The point was made that in some cases, disaggregation has to happen at various levels before the indicators become meaningful.

*   The costs involved in collecting data have to be recognized. There are ways of thinking about these costs. Many of these efforts that AID makes to collect useful information through political polling or by asking some indigenous group to make certain kinds of independent observations on legislative process or on local governments should be thought of not only as a monitoring effort by AID but real programming activities, real major contributions to the process of democratic growth. The example was cited about a minor effort in polling in Nepal that came out of an effort to impart some training to people. There was a poll in Katmandu and the results were reflected in articles in the Far East and Economic Review and in the local press. Polls can become, if they are good efforts, a focus for intellectuals and political leaders and people who are active in the civil society to talk about how AID is doing, if things are going in the right direction, and they become programming efforts in and of themselves.

Next Steps:

*   Other democracy officers should be involved in this process. This should be more than a retrospective document, but a hands-on type of approach.

The 'Phenomenon' of Democracy:

*   We tend to use the word 'stable' and 'consolidate' as the noble words to describe democracy. But 'unstable', in the sense of more groups participating in the process, more people involved, changing rules of the game, is also a positive view of democracy.

*   A question was raised about whether anybody thought of making democracy in certain areas a cross cutting objective, rather than objective in itself. There was concern about whether some democracy indicators should be monitored in countries where AID does not have a democracy program. This would enable one to obtain information on whether/what type of impact AID's other programs are having on democracy.

*   There needs to be time spent examining the overlap between impacts in the different areas of democracy. For example, civil society and advocacy groups, particularly in human rights. There is also the issue of overlap within democracy sector and between democracy sector and other Agency imperatives.

FOLLOW-UP ACTIVITIES

USAID DEMOCRACY AND GOVERNANCE PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENT WORKSHOP

Democracy and Governance Indicators

TABLE 1: Strengthened Rule of Law Increased Respect for Human Rights

OBJECTIVES	INDICATORS
Objective 1.0: Strengthened Rule of Law Increased Respect for Human Rights	*RESULT 1: Increased expectation of timely and impartial application of the law*
	1. Percent of users/practitioners/lawyers/other experts who have this expectation
	2. Case mix - percentage change in the kinds of cases brought to court (i.e., involving corruption, commercial issues, human rights)
	RESULT 2: The Justice System protects against violations of the law by public officials
	3. Number/percent of those accused of human rights prosecuted; percent of those prosecuted convicted
	4. Number accused of corruption prosecuted; percent of those prosecuted who are convicted
	5. Number of detainees who are pre-trial and pre-sentencing; average length of stay
	RESULT 3: Citizens accept the importance and value of equal rights for all citizens
	6. Percent of population believing in equal rights

OBJECTIVES	INDICATORS
Supporting Objective 1.1: Improved Timeliness	1. Average or mean case processing time
	RESULT 1: Improved investigations
	2. Average or mean length of time from the start of an investigation until case filing
	RESULT 2: Improved procedures
	3. Reforms implemented (yes/no, by reform)
	4. Number lawyers sanctioned or percent cases in which lawyers are sanctioned by judges for causing unnecessary delays
	RESULT 3: Burden on the courts lifted
	5. Rate of increase in cases filed in the courts and/or in ADR programs
	6. Number of cases resolved through ADR programs (proxy)
Supporting Objective 1.2: Expanded Knowledge of Legal Rights	1. Percent of the (target) population knowing / understanding specific rights
	2. Number of cases involving legal rights brought by target groups
Supporting Objective 1.3: More Effective Judicial Process/Consistent Application of the Law	*RESULT 1: Judges and court officials have access to the law*
	1. Targeted laws are: a) up-to-date b) published in a timely manner c) available to all judges and court officials d) organized in a manner which facilitates research
	RESULT 2: Judges are knowledgeable about the law
	2. Numbers trained supplemented by self-reporting judges on what they believe they have learned and whether and how they have applied their new knowledge

OBJECTIVES	INDICATORS
Supporting Objective 1.3: More Effective Judicial Process/Consistent Application of the Law (con't)	*RESULT 3: Independence of judges*
	3. Judicial selection and promotion based on merit and achievement (fully/partly/not at all) (coupled with indicator 4)
	4. Percent of judges hired under the merit system
	5. Judges' salaries are commensurate with a professional middle class standard of living (yes/no or percent of equivalent position)
	6. Existence of judicial tenure law (yes/no)
	RESULT 4: The judicial branch is independent
	7. The justice system controls the spending of its budget (yes/no)
	RESULT 5: Court officials, lawyers and judges respect ethical standards
	8. An ethics code exists for the judiciary (yes/no)
	9. Investigative entity is operational, as judged by the number of investigations
	10. Number court officials removed or sanctioned
	11. Number lawyers sanctioned (by the local equivalent of the Bar Association)
	RESULT 6: Procedures modernized
	12. Oral trial proceedings instituted (criminal/civil; fully/partially/not at all)
	13. Trial proceedings modernized and instituted (criminal/civil; fully/partially/not at all)
	14. Percent of criminal/civil trials in which the judges followed the correct trial procedures.
	15. Percent of criminal cases in which prosecutors followed proper investigative procedures
	16. Existence of a system for bail and pre-trial release (yes/no)
	17. Percent of those accused of a first criminal offense or non-violent crime obtaining pre-trial release.

OBJECTIVES	INDICATORS
Supporting Objective 1.3: More Effective Judicial Process/Consistent Application of the Law (con't.)	*RESULT 7: Improved investigative techniques*
	18. Percent of criminal trials in which forensic evidence is presented
	RESULT 8: Improved prosecution
	19. Percent of cases investigated that go to trial
	20. Percent of criminal cases in which prosecutors perform satisfactorily
	RESULT 9: Court management improved
	21. Percent of cases for which the court can name the stage it is at without unreasonable delay
	22. Judicial statistics are used to manage (fully/partially/not at all)

OBJECTIVES	INDICATORS
Supporting Objective 1.4: Improved Monitoring and Advocacy of Human Rights (including the demand for judicial reform)	*RESULT 1: Increased investigation and prosecution of human rights violations*
	1. 1) Number of cases of official (government) violations of human rights; 2) percent of the total that are investigated; and 3) percent of those investigated that are prosecuted.
	2. 1) Number of citizen (non-unofficial) violations of human rights; 2) percent of the total that are investigated 3) percent of those investigated that are prosecuted
	RESULT 2: Increased advocacy and demand for justice sector reform
	3. Number stories in the media on justice or justice sector problems; or the number of stories developed by advocacy groups that kame it into the press on justice sector reform
	4. Percent of members of influential groups who accept the need for reform
	5. Number public hearings on reform; number citizens' groups testifying at the hearings
	6. Number citizens' groups taking part in official task forces on reform
	7. Active network of citizens' groups operational
	RESULT 3: Improved tracking and reporting of violations by the media and NGOs
	8. Number of print media entities/radio stations/TV stations devoting significant attention to human rights reporting
	9. Percent of population reached by the above entities
	10. Qualitative review of NGO monitoring and reporting

TABLE 2: Free and Fair Elections

OBJECTIVES	INDICATORS
Objective 2: Free and Fair Elections	1. At least two independent parties participating in elections
	2. Public opinion that elections are free, fair, and open. (disaggregated by gender, ethnicity, etc.)
	3. Public opinion that the electoral process was free and fair (registration, campaign, and elections), also disaggregated
	4. Rating of the elections by monitors (local and international) as free and fair
	5. Major opposition party boycotting the elections (yes/no).
	6. Percentage of eligible voters voting
	7. A peaceful transition takes place
	8. Parties accept electoral results (yes/no)
Supporting Objective 2.1: Creation of Impartial and Effective Laws and Regulations	1. Law established with reasonable regulations regarding voter registration, voting, and political competing rules (expert opinion)
	2. Electoral system deemed fair by political parties, interest groups, and citizens.
	3. Creation of independent election commission that functions autonomously (yes/no), (expert opinion)
	4. Laws promulgated and accessible to the public

OBJECTIVES	INDICATORS
Supporting Objective 2.2: More Impartial and Effective Electoral Administration	1. Electoral laws applied equally to all political parties (expert assessment)
	2. Electoral results accepted by all political parties (percent of people represented by these parties)
	3. Local election monitors' assessments of the quality of elections
	4. Election protests filed by candidates
	5. Electoral results published on time (within given timetable)
	6. Percent of eligible voters registered to vote (disaggregated by age [18-21], gender, ethnicity, and region)
	7. Public confidence in the electoral tribunal
Supporting Objective 2.3: Better Informed Electorate	1. Percent of voters knowledgeable of election issues
	2. Percent of voters that understand the advantages of participatory democratic systems
	3. Percent of voters knowledgeable of constitutional rights and responsibilities
	4. Percent of voters knowledgeable of voting procedures
	5. Percent of spoiled votes
Supporting Objective 2.4: Improved Local Monitoring	1. Number of election violations spotted/reported
	2. Fair treatment for monitors and whose findings have legal authority
	3. Parallel vote count completed by non-partisan local monitors
	4. Quality of the elections as determined by a non-partisan assessment

OBJECTIVES	INDICATORS
Supporting Objective 2.5: Political Parties are more Effective (most tentative - really brain storming).	1. Parties have platforms (yes/no)
	2. Effective local structure in place (debates, supporters)
	3. Parties are policy not personality oriented
	4. Internal political party rules exist
	5. Parties have the capacity to govern
	6. Parties are representative of their constituents (demographics)
	7. There exists coalition building

TABLE 3: Strengthened Civil Society

OBJECTIVES	INDICATORS
Objective 3: Strengthened Civil Society	*RESULT 1: Increased citizen/societal participation/influence in public policy making*
	1. Number of changes made to government policy as a result of civil society advocacy, participation, etc.
	2. Number of draft legislative initiatives introduced and voted upon by legislative branch in which there was societal participation in the deliberative process
	3. Number of parliamentary committee meetings held in which there was citizen/societal participation
	4. Number of executive branch commissions and councils established which provide a forum for state-society dialogue
	5. Percent of legislation passed with CSO lobbying
	6. Number/percent of legislative debates attended by CSOs
	7. Number of new government/CSO consultative mechanisms established
	RESULT 2: Broadened or increased citizen participation in civil society organizations
	8. Increased diversity of CSOs
	9. Increased number of CSOs
	10. Number of new consortia, umbrella organizations, federations, coalitions formed (horizontal and vertical integration)
	RESULT 3: Changes and broadening of democratic (civic) culture, values, beliefs, knowledge (and practices) Missions participating in civil society groups stated that they have such indicators already developed
	11. Increased tolerance for dissent, diverging points of view, and CSOs representing minorities
	12. Increased practice of democratic principles and processes (e.g., voting for board members, participation in decision-making) and good governance (e.g., transparency, accountability, and responsiveness) within CSOs

OBJECTIVES	INDICATORS
Objective 3: Strengthened Civil Society (con't.)	*RESULT 4: Free flow of information from independent and diverse sources*
	13. Degree of media censorship (qualitative indicator)
	14. Percent of media outlets privately owned (either for-profit private outlets or non-profit CSO outlets)
	15. Degree of opposing opinions or viewpoints expressed
Supporting Objective 3.1: Promoting legislation that encourages organization and operations of CSOs	*RESULT 1: Legislative Framework: Ease of establishing and operating CSOs (absence of legislation restricting formation of CSOs)*
	1. Existence of laws protecting freedom of association, assembly and speech
	2. Mechanisms, either judicial or regulatory, that provide CSOs with means for redress against restrictive legislation
	3. Consistent application of laws by concerned state agency regulators
	4. Perceptions of CSOs concerning legislative framework governing CSOs
	5. Concerned laws adequately communicated to and known by CSOs
	RESULT 2: Financial Framework: Incentives, policies, and/or legislation that encourages formation and operation of NGOs
	6. Existence of 'transactions costs' to form and operate CSOs onerous or supportive (e.g. rent-seeking or corrupt practices)
	7. Existence of tax incentives to encourage citizens to contribute voluntarily to CSOs
	8. Existence of tax exemptions on taxes (e.g. duty-free exonerations) provided for voluntary organizations, CSOs or NGOs

OBJECTIVES	INDICATORS
Supporting Objective 3.1: Promoting legislation that encourages organization and operations of CSOs (con't.)	*RESULT 3: Lack of bureaucratic and administrative impediments to CSO formation and operations (new result)*
	9. Length of time to register a CSO
	10. Total financial costs for registration
	11. Existence of other impediments to registration such as geographic location where registration must take place
	12. Existence of onerous requirements for CSO registration following registration (e.g., periodicity of reporting requirements, audits and evaluations)
	13. Opinions of CSOs concerning impediments or incentives to CSO formation and operations
	RESULT 4: Protection of CSOs from state (political) interference
	14. Harassment of CSO officers and media owners and journalists
	15. Number of violent acts against CSO staff, members, media owners, journalists, etc. in past year
	16. Number of CSOs and media outlets closed down in past year
	17. Number of complaints filed with human rights organizations
	18. Number of legal proceedings taken against state executive agencies related to CSOs

OBJECTIVES	INDICATORS
Supporting Objective 3.2: Strengthening civil society's oversight of state institutions	*RESULT 1: Increased capability of CSOs to ensure state institutions practice good governance*
	1. Number of CSO prepared studies, analyses, and assessments that are widely disseminated in society and government
	2. Increased informational openness and transparency of executive and legislative branch and decision-making processes, including the allocation and management of public resources
	3. Increased accountability of state institutions for their impact on their public policy decisions
	4. Increased responsiveness to citizen requests for information or redress of state actions
	5. Existence of publications of parliamentary debate of policies and their frequency
	6. Existence of publications of the budget and budgetary expenditures and their frequency
	7. Frequency of legal challenges to legislation and/or public policies
	8. Number of CSOs directly engaging the state over issues of public government performance

OBJECTIVES	INDICATORS
Supporting Objective 3.3: Promoting more effective management of CSOs	*RESULT 1: Financial viability*
	1. Percent of funds from independent sources supporting CSO operations and programs
	2. Percent of funds coming from members
	3. Percent of funds recovered from members or clients that contribute to financing CSO operating costs
	4. Percent of funds coming from donors and the diversification (i.e., number) of donors
	5. Percent (extent to which) of funds generated by CSO covers overall operating and program costs
	RESULT 2: Transparency of CSO management
	6. Organizational records available
	7. Financial records regularly audited by independent source
	8. Completeness of meeting minutes
	RESULT 3: Increased demand for CSO services
	9. Number of clients being served by CSO
	10. Number of requests by government for CSOs to participate in service delivery
	11. Number of donors funding CSOs to undertake services formerly provided by government
	12. Number of clients requesting CSOs for services

OBJECTIVES	INDICATORS
Supporting Objective 3.4: Increasing Internal CSO Democratic Governance Practices	*RESULT 1: Increased member/client participation in decision-making*
	1. Number of members voting on policy initiatives
	2. Number of sub-committees of board of directors and members per sub-committee dealing with policy formulation
	3. Number of decentralized units of the CSO involved in decision and policy making
	4. Number of consultations held with clients to gain input into policies/decisions which affect them
	5. Types and numbers of mechanisms which CSO employs to gain member/client input (e.g., evaluations, open fora)
	RESULT 2: Representativeness of membership
	6. Elections of governing entities held at regular intervals
	7. Degree of turnover of CSO officers/board members
	8. Officers/management reflect composition of management
	RESULT 3: Accountability and responsiveness of officers/board members and management body to members and/or clients
	9. Types and number of mechanisms through which members and clients can convey feedback on policies and services provided by CSO
	10. Number of responses by CSO to member, client or general public inquiries
	11. Time between member, client or general public inquiries and CSO response
	12. Frequency of CSO reporting, including financial reporting of members/clients, government and donors

OBJECTIVES	INDICATORS
Supporting Objective 3.5: Increasing participation in policy formulation and implementation	*RESULT 1: Increased direct methods undertaken to influence public policy*
	1. Number of direct actions (e.g. petitions, participation on presidential commissions) taken up in support of opposition to government (executive branch) policies
	2. Number CSOs brought into legislative process (e.g. testifying before congressional committees)
	3. Number of policy papers and draft legislation prepared on national and local issues
	4. Number of legal cases brought by CSOs before courts (constitutional, criminal and civil) challenging policies and laws
	5. Number of actual policies and/or laws changed as a result of CSO lobbying/advocacy
	6. Number of reforms/reformist actions taken
	7. Number and types of fora in which CSOs engage state institutions in policy debate
	8. Increased and more diverse media coverage or public debates
	RESULT 2: Increased proportion of population involved in influencing public policy
	9. Percent of population represented by CSOs
	10. Number of CSOs taking positions on public issues
	RESULT 3: More minority groups involved
	11. Number of CSOs representing women's issues
	12. Number of CSOs representing ethnic and religious minorities

OBJECTIVES	INDICATORS
Supporting Objective 3.5: Increasing participation in policy formulation and implementation (con't.)	*RESULT 4: CSOs join to promote/oppose specific policies or laws*
	13. Number of coalitions formed to promote/oppose specific policies/legislation
	14. Number of networks, umbrella organizations existing that represent groupings of CSOs
	15. Number of cross-sectoral coalitions and alliances which include CSOs
	16. Diversity of coalitions formed
	17. Duration of coalitions
Supporting Objective 3.6 Broadening the acceptance of democratic (civic values)	*RESULT 1: Citizens show more tolerance for minority groups*
	1. Percent of citizens polled expressing positive attitudes towards minorities
	2. Number or percent of anti-minority incidents reported
	3. Degree of participation of minorities in public life
	RESULT 2: Women participate fully in social, economic and political life
	4. Number of women in elective offices
	5. Number of women appointed to leadership positions in executive branch agencies
	6. Number of laws restricting women's employment opportunities or access to commercial loans
	RESULT 3: Civic education actively pursued
	7. Number or percent of population attending civic education classes
	8. Civic education included in school curriculum
	9. Number of CSOs providing civic education

OBJECTIVES	INDICATORS
Supporting Objective 3.6 Broadening the acceptance of democratic (civic values) (con't.)	*RESULT 4: Citizen acceptance of democratic principles and governance practices increased*
	10. Percent of citizens who adhere to democratic principles and good governance practices
	11. Percent of citizens who understand constitutional responsibilities
	12. Number of citizens who belong to and participate in self-governing associations at both the local and national levels
Supporting Objective 3.7 Promoting a more independent and effective media	*RESULT 1: Media represents all segments of society*
	1. Number/percent of media outlets owned or operated by minority groups
	2. Number/percent of women in media
	3. Media content, including views and opinions reflecting wider society
	RESULT 2: Government control of media is limited
	4. Number or percent of privately-owned media outlets
	5. Percent of media outlets independent or government funding
	6. Degree to which materials and facilities are distributed equally or to which there is equitable access
	RESULT 3: Open access to different points of view
	7. Degree of media censorship
	8. Number of media outlets closed down or suspended
	9. Number of journalists harassed or jailed
	10. Percent of news coverage expressing opposing views

OBJECTIVES	INDICATORS
Supporting Objective 3.7 Promoting a more independent and effective media (con't.)	*RESULT 4: Media adhere to professional standards*
	11. Number or percent of journalists professionally trained
	12. Recognized professional associations develop and hold members to code of conduct
	13. Libel laws enforced
	14. Investigative reporting free and unbiased

Table 4: More Accountable Governance

OBJECTIVES	INDICATORS
Objective 4: More Accountable Governance	*Local government public services and revenues*
	1. Percent of countries where 50% of public revenues are locally generated and controlled
	2. Number of regional and local governments providing social and public services previously provided by the central government; percent of citizens receiving them
	Rate of growth of democratic institutions
	3. Rate of growth of democratic institutions (Parliament, NGOs, etc., trade unions)
	Citizen perception of responsiveness of governments to citizens/minorities
	4. Citizens are treated as customers of government/government personnel
	5. Number of citizens who believe they have a voice in the decisions that affect their lives, either individually or through associations formed around common interests (by gender)
	6. Ethnic/religious minorities who feel their rights are protected and promoted
	Citizen awareness/participation in decision-making - individuals, NGOs, collectively
	7. Percent of communities in a country where X% of resources are being efficiently used for projects by voting citizens
	8. Number/percent of citizens who individually or collectively have been in contact with MP or staff member (or legislature)
	9. Percent of countries whose systems of governance provide avenues for participatory public policy making at the lower level appropriate
	10. Number/percent of governments (at all levels) that have active systems in place for publishing/disseminating information
	11. Increased active public debate on key issues/decisions of government and extent of NGO involvement in debate

OBJECTIVES	INDICATORS
Objective 4: More Accountable Governance (con't.)	*Relative independence/power of legislature vis-a-vis other branches*
	12. Number of independent-functioning legislatures
	13. Number of countries in which legislatures and judiciaries hold significant power in relation to executive branch (a balance of power among the three branches)
	14. Percent of countries with X% of legislation (a) drafted and (b) enacted by the legislative branch rather than the executive branch
	15. Percent of countries where national budget is controlled by the legislature
	16. Extent to which legislatures have and use the authority to review/approve government decisions, budgets, appointments, etc.
	U.S. policy/national interest objectives
	17. Number of American companies experiencing greater access/trade to/with developing country markets without resorting to corruption/pay off to government officials
	18. Percent reduction in anti-American activities (including terrorism) from non-democracies and transitioning developing countries
	19. Number of conflicts in which the US has been engaged
	Movement toward democracy
	20. Number of countries operating under constitutions that represent social compacts (fundamental law)
	21. Percent of actual governments that have increased efforts toward democratic governance [including experiments, dialogues, discussions] that didn't previously exist)
	22. Number of countries in which highest executive branch officials are chosen by national election

OBJECTIVES	INDICATORS
Objective 4: More Accountable Governance (con't.)	*Money saved from reduction in corruption/inefficiency*
	23. Number of dollars saved from corruption, efficiency as a result of executive oversight, legislative oversight and independent audits (could be percent of national budget)
	Officials prosecuted
	24. Number of countries in which high-level officials are prosecuted, convicted, sentenced for corrupt practices
	Executive control of military budget
	25. Number of countries in which executive branch has control of military budget
Supporting Objective 4.1: Increased Local Government Participation in Basic Government Functions	1. Percent of national revenue allocated to local government
	2. Amount (%) of locally-collected revenue in local government budget (closely related to number 1)
	3. Passage of legal, fiscal, and procurement reforms that empower local government

OBJECTIVES	INDICATORS
Supporting Objective 4.2: More effective and independent legislatures	1. Percent of citizens who believe they are being represented by the legislature
	2. Percent of membership-based organizations that believe they can access, be heard by the legislature
	3. Extent to which legislature uses information provided by research units
	4. Number of public hearings held
	5. Percent of laws passed that have been significantly amended by the legislature
	6. Number/type of NGO groups working with the legislature: providing testimony to...; giving information to..., helping draft information on....
	7. Legislature is fulfilling its constitutional responsibilities
	8. Number of bills (introduced/enacted) by (minority party members/members of Parliament)
	9. Number of sanctions: identified (hearings); made (adopted); accepted by the Executive
	10. Number of recommendations: identified (hearings); made (adopted); accepted by the Executive